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"Without Favor, Denial, or Delay"': Will North Carolina
Finally Adopt the Merit Selection of Judges?
I. INTRODUcTION
North Carolina has chosen its judges through partisan elections
for over 130 years.2 So far, this method has provided North Carolina
with a steady supply of competent and qualified judges. Yet on
December 6, 1996, the Commission for the Future of Justice and the
Courts in North Carolina ("Futures Commission") delivered a report
to North Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Burley Mitchell
which sought to change the status quo.4 Past Chief Justice James
Exum created the Futures Commission in 1994 and charged the
group with examining the needs and challenges facing North
Carolina's court system in the twenty-first century. After two years
of studying the court system, the Futures Commission concluded that
fundamental judicial reform was necessary to ensure that the courts
could meet the public's demand for a better judicial system. 6 One of
the principal reforms proposed was the abandonment of partisan
elections for North Carolina's judges in favor of a system of merit
1. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18 ("All courts shall be open; every person for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of
law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay.").
2. See Joan G. Brannon & James C. Drennan, Courts and Civil Procedure, in
NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1996, at 3-2 to -3 (Joseph S. Ferrell ed., 1996)
[hereinafter N.C. LEG. 1996]. Beginning in 1998, superior court judges will be chosen in
nonpartisan elections. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, § 1, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra
Sess. 554, 554.
3. See JUDICIAL SELECTION STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
SELECTION STUDY COMMISSION 5 (N.C. 1989) [hereinafter JSSC]; Joel Rosch & Eva R.
Rubin, The Case Against Judicial Election Reform, N.C. INSIGHT, June 1987, at 28, 29.
But see Letter from Susie Sharp, Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, to
Park Helms, Representative in the North Carolina House of Representatives (Mar. 9,
1977), quoted in Jack Betts, Still Waiting in the Legislative Wings, N.C. INSIGHT, June
1987, at 15, 16 ("We have many excellent district court judges. Some are outstanding
jurists. Unfortunately, however, a minority of these judges are so highly unqualified that
they are damaging the image of that echelon; and if we continue to elect such judges, they
will inevitably tarnish the image of the entire judiciary.").
4. See COMMISSION FOR THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE AND THE COURTS IN N.C.,
WITHOUT FAVOR, DENIAL OR DELAY: A COURT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(1996) [hereinafter WFDD].
5. See id. at iii; see also infra notes 338-41 and accompanying text (discussing the
creation of the Futures Commission).
6. See WFDD, supra note 4, at iii.
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selection.7 North Carolina, like many states across the country, has
recently experienced a growing trend of intensely competitive and
expensive judicial elections that involved behavior more akin to the
highly partisan races for state and national legislators.' According to
the Futures Commission, North Carolina "can expect increasing
criticism of the courts as part of campaigns, which will lead to even
more negative perceptions and greater public distrust."9
In general, judicial merit selection begins with a neutral
nominating committee made up of lawyers and non-lawyers that
creates and screens a list of potential judicial nominees. An
executive official then selects the final appointee from that list. °
Merit-based selection of judges is not a new idea in North Carolina."
Although merit selection has not been warmly received by North
Carolina's legislators in the past, 2 the current effort at judicial
reform may be more welcome. 3
This Comment examines the current movement to reform the
judicial selection system in North Carolina. In Part II, this Comment
begins by explaining the importance of how judges are selected and
by reviewing the history of judicial selection in North Carolina. 4
After discussing in Part III the growing problems with judicial
elections in North Carolina today, 5 Part IV explores the history of
7. See id.
8. See Jane Ruffin, Party Politics Are Hauled into Court, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 30, 1990, at J1.
9. WFDD, supra note 4, at 6. John G. Medlin, Jr., Chairman of the Futures
Commission, in a preamble to the Commission's report, observed that the courts are
intended to serve the public. See id. at 1. Consequently, if the public is dissatisfied, "then
something needs to change, because in the final analysis, one of the cornerstones of
democracy and civil society is support for and confidence in the court system." Id. at 1.
10. See ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT
SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 12 (1974).
11. The North Carolina Courts Commission first proposed that North Carolina adopt
a merit selection plan for judges in 1971. See NORTH CAROLINA COURTS COMM'N, 1971
REPORT OF THE COURTS COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 11-15 [hereinafter
1971 COURTS COMMISSION].
12. Efforts to reform North Carolina's method of judicial selection have been
introduced in almost every session of the General Assembly since 1971 with little success.
See N.C. LEG. 1996, supra note 2, at 3-2 to -3. However, North Carolina could amend its
constitution to provide for the appointment of all state judges without violating any
provision of the Federal Constitution. See Holshouser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928, 934
(M.D.N.C. 1971), affd, 409 U.S. 807 (1972) ("[T]he election of Superior Court judges is
not a necessary characteristic of a republican form of government and is not required by
the Constitution of the United States. Anyway,... this would be a political rather than a
judicial question.").
13. See infra notes 498-502 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 21-113 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 114-266 and accompanying text.
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judicial reform efforts in North Carolina over the past twenty-five
years, focusing on the reasons for failure. 6 Part V examines the
Futures Commission's proposed merit selection plan and weighs the
arguments for and against merit selection in general.17 Part VI then
evaluates the current reform proposal in light of these past failures.18
Part VII considers barriers that will continue to obstruct changes to
the judicial elective system,9 and this Comment concludes in Part
VIII by suggesting that although a switch to a merit selection system
may be in the state's best interest, it is unlikely that such a change
will happen in the near future. 0
II. JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS
A. Why We Should Care How Judges Are Selected.
It is commonly believed that judges apply the law, not make it."
Former North Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Susie Sharp
subscribed to this ideal and once delineated four steps in deciding a
case: "1) state the facts; 2) state the issue raised by the facts; 3) state
the law relevant to the issue; and 4) decide the issue in light of the
law."' Using this method, any two judges should come to the same
conclusion on any given matter.2 If so, it would not seem to be very
important who wears the robe.
However, even the first step of Justice Sharp's formula-stating
the facts-involves a great deal of subjective and intellectual
interpretation on the part of the judge.24 Indeed, in the context of a
trial, a judge is often called upon to serve as the final arbiter of
16. See infra notes 267-336 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 337-403 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 404-62 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 463-90 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 491-502 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., John V. Orth, The Role of the Judiciary in Making Public Policy, in
NORTH CAROLINA FOCUS: AN ANTHOLOGY ON STATE GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND
POLICY 339 (Mebane Rash Whitman & Ran Coble eds., 1996) (noting that "[t]he ideal
that judges should enforce the law, not make it, has attracted many judges"). Walter
Clark, Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court in the early 19th century, put it
more bluntly: " 'Whatever tends to increase the power of the judiciary over the legislature
diminishes the control of the people over their government.'" Id. (quoting Chief Justice
Clark).
22 Id. (paraphrasing an often expressed opinion of Chief Justice Sharp).
23. See id.
24. See Byron R. White, The Special Role of State Judges, 30 JUDGES' J., Spring 1991,
at 7.
[Vol. 762268
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politically and emotionally charged factual issues32 This role is
crucial because the disposition of most cases will depend on the
resolution of factual disputes rather than legal arguments. 26 Further,
courts of appeal rarely set aside the factual findings of trial judges
unless clearly erroneous, thus placing additional importance on the
initial findings of fact.' Therefore, without making any decisions
concerning the applicable law, a judge's interpretation of the facts
will have a significant influence on the outcome of the case.
In addition to the importance of factual determinations in the
day-to-day judicial routine, judges must be able to handle complex
legal issues when they arise. Judges not only determine what law is
relevant in a particular instance, whether codified by the legislature
into statutes or set out by other judges as precedent, but must come
to a conclusion about what the law means in a given situation.2
Statutes, which any student of the law knows are not always clear,
must be construed and interpreted.29 Moreover, the common law
must be evaluated and updated periodically.30 And occasionally, the
judiciary must interpret and enforce the limitations on legislative and
executive power contained in both the federal and state
constitutions. 31  These types of legal determinations are made by
25. See Frederick M. Baker, Jr., Judicial Selection, 75 MICH. B.J. 898, 898 (1996).
26. See White, supra note 24, at 6, 7.
27. See id. at 7.
28. See id. at 7-8; cf. BARBARA M. YARNOLD, POLITICS AND THE COURTS:
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF PUBLIC LAW 5 (1992) (observing that "courts were
relatively unconstrained in their decision making by the law because the standards they
were called on to interpret were vague").
29. See Orth, supra note 21, at 340. Professor Orth notes:
Since a statute is produced in the political give-and-take of legislative
bargaining, many gaps and inconsistencies may be left for the courts to deal
with, as best they may. Charged with the duty of carrying out the will of the
legislature, the modem judge must read the statute in such a way that public
policy will be effectuated, not stymied.
Id. Some scholars have even pointed to the institutional advantages of the judiciary in
policy-making. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (arguing that judges have certain advantages in
policy-making situations because they are more isolated from direct political or public
opinion, traditionally try to be as neutral as possible in making decisions, are given a great
deal of information through the adversarial process, and can develop ad hoc policies
tailored to remedy specific problematic situations).
30. See Orth, supra note 21, at 340 ("The common law is ... law made by past judicial
decisions in keeping with the then current views of public policy. As society changes, so
does the common law in order to conform to changed conditions."). In this capacity, the
court is often called upon to make a decision that effectively acts like a statute, although
it was neither passed by the legislature nor signed by the governor. See id. at 341.
31. See White, supra note 24, at 8. The duty to enforce limits on the legislative and
executive branches, which ensures the protection of citizens from arbitrary official action,
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judges in trials each and every day.
As a result of these important factual and legal determinations,
the judiciary clearly influences laws every day, even if judges do not
actually make laws in the technical sense.3 2 Accordingly, the judicial
branch serves an important function in making public policy.3 3 The
courts' role as shapers of public policy is most apparent at the state
level, simply because the majority of everyday legal issues are
decided by trial judges in state courts.3a In this respect, state trial
court judges have "the greatest impact on our citizens and on our
citizens' views of how justice is delivered in this country."35  To
perform their duties satisfactorily and live up to these expectations,
the quality and characteristics of those who sit on the state bench
becomes important 6.3  A state's method of judicial selection is
often entails making decisions in particular cases that run against the public opinion. See
id. This judicial duty is one of the American innovations that sets our system apart from
the English principle of legislative supremacy. See id.
32. See Orth, supra note 21, at 341; cf. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS,
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13-16 (1993) (discussing the extent of judicial power
generally).
33. See Orth, supra note 21, at 341. One commentator notes that:
In its policy-making function, the judicial branch allocates values for society
through structured settlements and judges' decisions that determine
governmental policies in education, housing, employment, and other important
areas of public policy. Although judges frequently claim that they merely follow
the law and do not create public policy, the consequences of judicial actions can
unquestionably shape large-scale governmental actions.
SMITH, supra note 32, at 9. The issue of whether judges are policy-makers has even been
the focus of legal disputes concerning the applicability of mandatory retirement ages for
state judges. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456, 465 (1991) (holding that state
judges could be forced to retire after a certain age). In Gregory, Missouri state judges
challenged that state's mandatory retirement age under the Federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994 & Supp. 1995). See Gregory,
501 U.S. at 456. Petitioners argued that state judges did not make public policy and
therefore were protected by the ADEA and could not be held to mandatory retirement
ages. See id. at 465 ("[J]udges merely resolve factual disputes and decide questions of
law; they do not make policy."). The U.S. Supreme Court avoided directly deciding
whether judges were policy-makers, determining only that, due to the broad statutory
language of the ADEA, judges fall under the "policymaking-level exception." Id. at 467.
34. See White, supra note 24, at 6 ("[S]tate law looms much larger than federal law in
the lives of our nation's citizens. Consequently, state trial judges play an integral part in
the determination of justice in this country.").
35. Id. Similarly, state supreme courts have re-emerged as "major policy-making
institutions in our political-legal system." HARRY P. STUMPF & JOHN H. CULVER, THE
POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 149-50 (1992) ("[W]hereas only a decade or two ago
American constitutional law was almost exclusively the province of the federal courts, it is
now impossible to understand the leading edge of American legal doctrine without
serious attention to developments in state constitutional law.").
36. Cf Baker, supra note 25, at 898 ("So it is that we demand that those among us
who would be judges be better than we, learned, impartial, and, above all, correct.").
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therefore important because the selection process can affect the
quality of the judges who serve 7 as well as "limit the risk of excessive
judicial influence on public policy."38
B. Different Methods of Judicial Selection
Methods of judicial selection vary from state to state and often
reflect unique political factors within each state. 9 Scholars and
politicians, as well as the general public, have debated over the most
appropriate method of judicial selection for more than 200 years.40
Following the American Revolution, all thirteen original colonies,41
as well as the federal government,42 created appointive judicial
selection systems. 43 Eight of the colonies vested the appointment
power in one or both houses of the state legislature.' The remaining
five allowed the governor to make appointments.45 Political leaders
37. See id. at 898-99. But see STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 35, at 48 (arguing that,
in fact, there seems to be little, if any, difference among the professional qualifications of
judges recruited by various methods of judicial selection).
38. SMITH, supra note 32, at 295. Smith notes that:
In states with electoral systems, the voters have the opportunity to replace
judicial officers whose decisions are regarded as too extreme or as
inappropriately influencing public policy. Governors, legislatures, and selection
committees seek to appoint new judges with appropriately restrained
conceptions of judicial power-especially if previous appointees have seemed to
push the limits of judicial authority beyond proper boundaries.
Id. Thus, the judicial selection process helps to keep the judiciary's decisions from
deviating too far from the general preferences of the voters. See id.
39. See STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 35, at 37-43.
40. See ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 10, at 7-9.
41. See PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 6 (1990).
42. See MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY-SELECTION,
COMPENSATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 3 (1987). The U.S. Constitution grants the
President the power to appoint judges to the Supreme Court and federal bench, subject to
confirmation by the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
43. See Daniel R. Deja, How Judges Are Selected: A Survey of the Judicial Selection
Process in the United States, 75 MICH. B.J. 904, 904-06 (1996) (discussing the two
appointive methods used currently-gubernatorial appointment and gubernatorial
appointment with retention elections).
44. See COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 42, at 3-5. Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia gave
their legislatures the power to appoint judges. See id. South Carolina and Virginia still
use legislative appointments for most judgeships. See S.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 8, 13
(amended 1985); VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; Deja, supra note 43, at 905. In these states, the
appointment process involves a joint vote by the members of the legislature, with the
candidate receiving the most votes getting the appointment. See STUMPF & CULVER,
supra note 35, at 42.
45. See COMISKY & PATrERSON, supra note 42, at 3 (noting that judges were
appointed by governors in Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and
Pennsylvania). Eighteen states currently use gubernatorial appointments. See Deja,
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of that time subscribed to the belief that the electorate was not
capable of evaluating the professional qualities of judicial
candidates.46 Appointments were usually for long periods of time,
often life.47
A dramatic shift in selection practices occurred throughout the
states in the early 1800s with the advent of Jacksonian democracy.48
The movement advocated the subjection of all public officials,
including judges, to the direct approval of the people.49 In a short
period of time, a majority of the states switched to the partisan
election of judges.5 0 However, partisan elections were designed "to
supra note 43, at 904. Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont use gubernatorial appointments for initial selection,
followed by a subsequent reappointment process. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; HAW.
CONST. art. VI, § 3 (amended 1994); ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 8 (amended 1988); MASS.
CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. 9; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 46 (amended 1976); N.J. CONST. art.
VI, § 6, 1 (amended 1983); R.I. CONST. art. X, § 4 (amended 1974); VT. CONST. ch. II,
§§ 32, 34 (amended 1994). Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Missouri, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming initially select judges by gubernatorial
appointment followed by retention elections. See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5, 6; ARIZ.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 37, 38 (amended 1992); COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 20, 25 (amended
1967); IOWVA CONST. art. V, §§ 15,17; KAN. CONST. art. III, § 5; MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 5,
5A (amended 1980); MO. CONST. art. V, §§ 25(a), 25(c)(1) (amended 1976); NEB. CONST.
art. V, § 21, cI. 1 & 3 (amended 1972); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, §§ 8, 9; WYO. CONST. art.
5, § 4.
46. See COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 42, at 3-4.
47. Some states along the eastern seaboard still maintain this practice. For example,
Delaware provides initial 12-year terms before reappointment. Massachusetts provides
that, once appointed, judges serve until age 70. New Hampshire, likewise, provides for
service until age 70, and Rhode Island allows judges to serve for life. See DEL. CONST.
art. IV, § 3; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. I; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 78; R.I. CONST. art.
10, § 5 (amended 1994).
48. Advocates of Jacksonian democracy, a movement with "its genesis in populist
thought," felt state judiciaries should no longer favor the landed elite, but "should be
more sympathetic to the needs of debtors, manual laborers, and other disenfranchised
people." DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON
STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLIcY 2 (1995).
49. See ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 10, at 9.
50. See id. Mississippi became the first state to elect all judges in 1832. See id. New
York was next to move towards the direct popular election of judges, making the change
during its constitutional convention in 1846. See id. All new states subsequently entering
the Union did so with an elected judiciary. See id. Twenty-four of 34 states chose their
judges through direct elections by the time of the Civil War. See id. North Carolina made
the transition to an elective judiciary shortly after the Civil War. See infra notes 68-71
and accompanying text. Twelve states continue to use partisan elections today in some
form: Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. See ALA. CODE §§ 17-2-
6, 17-2-7 (1997); ARK. CONST. art. VII, §§ 6, 17; ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12; IND. CONST
art. VII, § 7; LA. CONST. art. V, § 22 (amended 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-193
(1997); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 33 (amended 1988); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 6(c); N.C.
CONST. art. IV, §§ 10, 16; PA. CONST. art. V, § 13 (amended 1979); TEX. CONST. art. V,
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insert populist ideology into the staffing of the courts," but not to
actually improve the quality of judges on the bench. 1 Political
machines soon gained control of the judicial selection process.5 2
Citizens came to view the judiciary as corrupt, incompetent, and
controlled by special interests. In an attempt to remedy the
situation, many elective states, still desiring to maintain the elective
process, adopted nonpartisan elections for judges between 1870 and
1930.14 Dissatisfaction soon arose with nonpartisan elections as well,
however, because political parties still selected the candidates. 5
Furthermore, the electorate was more uninformed than ever about
judicial candidates, no longer having party labels on which to rely5 6
To address these problems, a movement began within the legal
profession to develop a method of judicial selection that would
reduce the influence of partisan politics while focusing on
qualifications and accountability. 7 Professor Alex Kales, director of
research for the American Judicature Society, conceived an elective-
appointive system which became known as the merit selection plan.58
First adopted by Missouri in 1940,19 some form of the merit selection
plan is currently used by twenty states in choosing their judges.6"
Although the merit plans employed by various states are not
identical, most contain three common features: (1) a judicial
§§ 2, 4, 6,7; W. VA. CODE § 3-1-17 (1997); Deja, supra note 43, at 906.
51. STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 35, at 38.
52. See id.
53. See LARRY BERKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 4 (1980).
54. See COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 42, at 4. Eighteen states currently use
some form of nonpartisan elections: California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. See CAL. CONST. art.
VI, § 16; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b) (amended 1976); GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, 1;
IDAHO CONsT. art. V, §§ 6, 11; KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 6; KY. CONST. § 117; MICH. CONST.
art. VI, §§ 2, 8, 12; MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7; MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-14-211 (1997);
NEV. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 5; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-41.2 (1997); N.D. CONsT. art.VI,
§§ 7, 9; OHIO CONST. art. IV § 6; OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7
(amended 1980); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3; Wis. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4, 5, 7 (amended
1977); Deja, supra note 43, at 906 n.13.
55. See COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 42, at 4.
56. See id.
57. See SMITH, supra note 32, at 106.
58. See STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 35, at 41.
59. See COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 42, at 10. Thus, the system is often
called the "Missouri Plan" as well as the "merit plan" for judicial selection. See STUMPF
& CULVER, supra note 35, at 41.
60. See Jack Betts, The Debate over Merit Selection of Judges, in NORTH CAROLINA
FOCUS, supra note 21, at 316; see also Deja, supra note 43, at 906 (noting, for example,
Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Utah).
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nominating committee, generally composed of lawyers, judges, and
citizens, that screens potential judges and recommends a list of
worthy candidates; (2) an elected appointing official who is obligated
to choose judges from the nominating committee's list; and (3) a
noncompetitive retention election in which the judge must receive
the majority of a public vote to remain in office.61
C. Judicial Selection in North Carolina
1. Origins of Judicial Elections in North Carolina
Not until the ratification of North Carolina's second constitution
in 1868 did the voters of the state have the opportunity to elect judges
directly.6' The British Crown initially had appointed judges in
colonial North Carolina.63 This practice angered both the Lords
Proprietors64 and the colonists, although for different reasons.65 The
American Revolution presented an opportunity for change, and the
newly written North Carolina Constitution gave the General
Assembly the power to select both general and appellate jurisdiction
judges.66 For the next century, the legislature appointed North
Carolina's judges to "hold their offices during good behaviour." 67
After the Civil War, North Carolina was required to adopt a new
constitution in order to reenter the Union, and, given the
opportunity, chose to revisit the issue of judicial selection.68
61. See COMISKY & PATrERSON, supra note 42, at 10.
62. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 2. For an edited version of the debates
concerning judicial selection at the 1868 convention, see John V. Orth, Tuesday, February
11, 1868: The Day North Carolina Chose Direct Election of Judges, A Transcript of the
Debates from the 1868 Constitutional Convention, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1825, 1825 (1992)
[hereinafter Debate Transcript] (discussing the debates about judicial selection at North
Carolina's Constitutional Convention in 1868).
63. See Betts, supra note 3, at 15.
64. The Lords Proprietors were eight Englishmen who controlled colonial North
Carolina between 1663 and 1729 under the authority of a charter granted by King Charles
II. See DEPARTMENT OFTHE SECRETARY OF STATE, NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 1995-
1996, at 2 (Lisa A. Marcus ed., 1996).
65. See Betts, supra note 3, at 15. The Lords Proprietors viewed the Crown's
influence in judicial matters as infringing upon the powers granted by the Royal Charter.
See id. In contrast, the colonists believed they should be able to control their own affairs.
See id.
66. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 13. The governor appointed the justices of the peace,
who served on lower courts in each county, based upon recommendations made by
members of the General Assembly for that county. See James C. Drennan, Judicial
Reform in North Carolina, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 19, 22 (Anthony
Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993).
67. N.C CONST. of 1776, § 13.
68. See Debate Transcript, supra note 62, at 1826. The methods of judicial selection
[Vol. 762274
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Delegates to North Carolina's constitutional convention embraced
"Jacksonian democracy," the new philosophy calling for popular
election of all public officials, including judges.69 For the first time,
the citizens of North Carolina possessed the ability to elect trial and
appellate judges,70 a power they have retained ever since.71
Population growth and the effects of industrialization quickly
put new strains on the judicial system.72 Although local communities
responded by creating intermediate courts when needed, no
organized plan controlled this growth in the court system.7' By 1950,
there were more than 250 local courts with at least eight different
methods of judicial selection.74 Consequently, by the late 1950s and
early 1960s, court reform had become a central public issue.75
Members of state government and the business and legal
communities joined forces in supporting major court reform.76 A
study funded by the North Carolina Bar Association in the late 1950s
proposed a constitutional amendment that would eliminate all
independent local courts in favor of a single, state-run, state-financed
court system.77 Some members of this group even favored a switch to
a merit selection plan for judicial selection at that time.7s But in 1961,
when the General Assembly passed a proposed constitutional
amendment, the new judicial act called for the continued election of
had not been an important issue during the drafting and adoption of North Carolina's
Revolutionary Constitution in 1776. See id. Although judicial selection received more
attention during North Carolina's Second Constitutional Convention, the delegates still
only spent one day debating the issue. See id.
69. Cf BERKSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 4 (discussing movement towards
nonpartisan judicial elections); supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing
Jacksonian democracy).
70. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 21. The new constitution provided for
statewide elections for trial and appellate judges, see id., while justices of the peace were
elected locally. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 22.
71. See James Exum, Judicial Selection in North Carolina, Speech Presented to the
Judicial Selection Study Committee, in N.C. ST. B.Q., Summer 1988, at 4,5.
72- See Drennan, supra note 66, at 22.
73. See id. The legislature did not act to reform the structure of the court system
during this period, but allowed piecemeal remedies to address the legal needs of North
Carolina's citizens. See id.
74. See id. Many of these courts had their own jurisdiction levels, costs and fee
structures, and methods of compensation for the judges. See id. Compensation for
justices of the peace often depended upon the amount of fees they collected in court. See
id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON IMPROVING
AND EXPEDITING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN N.C. 1 (1958).
78. See Albert Coates, The Courts of Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow in North
Carolina, POPULAR GOV'T, Mar. 1958, at 5, 6.
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all judges.79 Failure to change North Carolina's method of judicial
selection at this time essentially shut the "window of opportunity" for
those seeking to eliminate judicial elections. 0
2. Current Judicial Structure and Selection Process in North Carolina
In 1962, the citizens of North Carolina voted to amend the North
Carolina Constitution in order to create a unified statewide and state-
operated court system.81 The present General Court of Justice
consists of three divisions: the Appellate Division (made up of the
North Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court of
Appeals),.8 the Superior Court Division, and the District Court
Division.83 The North Carolina Constitution requires that all
judgeships be filled by elections."
The supreme court serves as North Carolina's court of last
resort85 and consists of a chief justice and six associate justices. 86 All
supreme court justices are elected in statewide partisan elections and
serve eight-year termsY The supreme court hears cases involving
questions of constitutional law, major legal questions, and appeals
from murder convictions.' The court of appeals is North Carolina's
79. See Act of May 2, 1961, ch. 313, § 14,1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 436, 439-40.
80. Drennan, supra note 66, at 23. The failure to change the way judges were
selected at this time meant that judicial selection would be a constitutional issue for
future reformers. See id. Elections were the only constitutionally approved method of
selecting judges. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16. In order to eliminate judicial elections in
the future, three-fifths of both houses of the General Assembly must vote to change the
method of judicial selection, not just a majority of those present. See id. art. XIII, § 4
(setting out procedure for amending the constitution).
81. See JOAN G. BRANNON, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN NORTH CAROLINA 3 (1994).
Since 1970, the court system has been exclusively financed by the state, with the exception
of local court facilities, which local governments still provide. See Drennan, supra note
66, at 19.
82. See N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 5. Initially, the Appellate Division entailed only the
supreme court. In 1965, the General Assembly proposed amending the Judicial Article to
create the court of appeals to relieve the supreme court's heavy caseload. See BRANNON,
supra note 81, at 3. Voters approved the proposed amendment in a constitutional
referendum in 1966. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 7. The court of appeals began operating
in 1967. See BRANNON, supra note 81, at 3.
83. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
84. See id. § 16. However, a statutory exception applies for vacancies that occur
between elections, allowing the governor to fill the vacancy by appointment. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-9 (1997); infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (noting that a
majority of North Carolina's judges originally reached the bench as gubernatorial
appointees filling vacancies).
85. See BRANNON, supra note 81, at 3.
86. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 6, cl. 1.
87. See id. § 16.
88. See BRANNON, supra note 81, at 3.
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intermediate appellate court.89 It was created in 1967 to help ease the
supreme court's case load. 0 The court consists of twelve members
who sit in panels of three, with rotating membership on the panels.91
Court of appeals judges are also elected in statewide partisan
elections and serve eight-year terms.92 The court initially hears most
appeals unless the case is certified directly to the Supreme Court or
involves a first-degree murder conviction.93
The Superior Court Division serves as the trial court of general
jurisdiction in North Carolina, 94 having original jurisdiction over all
felonies and appellate jurisdiction over misdemeanors.9' Superior
courts generally entertain all civil matters involving more than
$10,000.96 There are just over ninety regularly-elected superior court
judges97 and four special superior court judgeships. 98 Superior court
judges are chosen in nonpartisan elections9 9 by the voters of each
judicial district'00 and serve eight-year terms.10 1 The District Court
Division consists of district court judges and magistrates.'02 District
courts have original jurisdiction over misdemeanors and most civil
actions involving less than $10,000.103 District courts also have
89. See iL at 4.
90. See id.; see also supra note 82 (discussing the creation of the court of appeals).
91. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16 (1995). See generally John V. Orth, Why the North
Carolina Court of Appeals Should Have a Procedure for Sitting En Banc, 75 N.C. L. REV.
1981 (1997) (arguing that all twelve members of the North Carolina Court of Appeals
should be able to hear cases as a single body in certain circumstances).
92. See BRANNON, supra note 81, at 12.
93. See id. at 4-5. One of the proposals of the Futures Commission is to give the court
of appeals the ability to hear initial appeals of first-degree murder convictions in order to
lighten the heavy burden on the supreme court. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 25.
94. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12, cl. 3.
95. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-271 (1995). Misdemeanors appealed to the superior
court from district court are heard de novo. See id. § 7A-271(b).
96. See id. § 7A-243.
97. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 79.
98. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.1(a), (al) (1995). Special superior court judges are
appointed by the governor and may be assigned by the chief justice to hold court in any
district without regard to home districts or rotation requirements. See BRANNON, supra
note 81, at 6-8. The number of special superior court judges has varied from two to eight
in recent history. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 21. Currently, there are four authorized
special superior court judgeships, two serving four-year terms and two serving five-year
terms. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.1 (a), (al).
99. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, § 1, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 554, 554
(codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-41.2 (1997)). Prior to 1998, superior court judges were
chosen in partisan elections. See BRANNON, supra note 81, at 12.
100. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, § 1, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 554, 554
(codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-41.2).
101. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
102 See BRANNON, supra note 81, at 8-10.
103. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-243, 272. Technically, superior and district courts
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exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile actions, domestic relations
actions, and involuntary commitments.' District court judges are
chosen in partisan elections by voters in each judicial district and
serve four-year terms. 05 There are currently about 190 district court
judges in North Carolina.10 6
Despite North Carolina's electoral system, the majority of North
Carolina's judges initially were appointed to the bench.'07 Judgeship
vacancies typically arise during a term due to death, resignation, or
retirement.0 8 The governor fills vacancies by appointment, with the
new judge standing for re-election at the next general election more
than sixty days after the appointment.10 9 The governor is required to
fill district court vacancies with a candidate from the same political
party, but otherwise has complete discretion in making these
appointments."0 Until recently, incumbent appointees rarely faced
opposition at the polls"' and almost always were victorious when
they did stand for re-election."' Consequently, a "system that
have concurrent jurisdiction over all civil matters, no matter the amount in controversy.
See id. § 7A-242. However, the General Assembly designated the district court as the
"proper" division for cases involving less than $10,000 and superior court as the "proper"
division for cases involving more than $10,000. See id. § 7A-243.
104. See id. § 7A-244, 246, 523. District courts also have magistrates who serve as
officers of the district court, and there must be at least one in every county. See id. § 7A-
171(a). The senior resident superior court judge appoints the magistrates for two-year
terms from a list of nominees submitted by the clerk of superior court. See id. § 7A-
171(b).
105. See id. § 7A-140; BRANNON, supra note 81, at 12.
106. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 79.
107. See Betts, supra note 60, at 315, 323. In 1995, 154 of the 296 judges, or 52%, were
appointed to their current offices. See id. at 322-23.
108. See BRANNON, supra note 81, at 12. Judges often retire during the term of a
governor from their political party, thus creating the opportunity for the appointment of a
new judge from the same party. See STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 35, at 43 (noting that
the "rules" of the game often require retirement during a time when the same party
controls the state house).
109. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 19; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-9 (1997). Thus, if a general
election is scheduled within sixty days of an appointment, the judge does not have to
stand for re-election until the next general election.
110. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-142 (1995). In Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410
S.E.2d 887 (1991), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the Constitution of North
Carolina did not prohibit the General Assembly from requiring the governor to give
preference to a member of the same political party as the vacating judge. See id. at 341,
410 S.E.2d at 894. For further discussion of the constitutionality of partisan qualifications
for appointments, see Matthew P. McGuire, Note, Baker v. Martin and the
Constitutionality of Partisan Qualifications for Appointment to District Courts, 70 N.C. L.
REv. 1916 (1992).
111. See NORTH CAROLINA COURTS COMM'N, 1985 REPORT OF THE COURTS
COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 25 [hereinafter 1985 COURTS COMMISSION].
112. See Exum, supra note 71, at 5.
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purport[ed] to give voters complete control over the selection of
judges [gave] them almost no control." 113
III. PROBLEMS WITH JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA
Voters in North Carolina have chosen their judges in partisan
elections for the past 130 years.1 In the next section, this Comment
will explore the main problems with North Carolina's judicial
selection system, looking at: (1) controversies surrounding the
election of superior court judges;"5 (2) the growing political nature of
judgeships;"6 and (3) the uninformed electorate."7
A. Disputes over the Election of Superior Court Judges
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965
In 1985, North Carolina's superior court election laws came into
direct conflict with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.118 Between 1900
and 1986, only two African-Americans were elected as superior court
judges in North Carolina, even though African-Americans
represented twenty-two percent of the voting population." 9 These
results were due in part to state election laws that often utilized
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See infra notes 118-83 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 184-248 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 249-58 and accompanying text.
118. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (amended by Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat.
134 (1982)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)). Congress intended the Act
to "eradicate invidious discrimination against racial minorities in the electoral process."
Kirsten Lundgaard Izatt, Note, The Voting Rights Act and Judicial Elections:
Accommodating the Interests of States Without Compromising the Goals of the Act, 1996
U. ILL. L. REv. 229, 229. In order to prevent changes in election laws that have a
discriminatory purpose or effect, § 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires covered
jurisdictions to obtain either judicial preclearance from the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia or administrative preclearance from the Department of Justice
before implementing new voting practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act is broader in scope and disallows methods of electing judges that
impermissibly dilute minority voting strength. As amended in 1982, § 2(a) prohibits the
imposition of a voting qualification or prerequisite that "results in a denial or abridgment
of the right ... to vote on account of race or color." Id.,§ 1973(a) (emphasis added).
Section 2(b) states that the test for determining such a practice is whether, based on the
totality of the circumstances, minority voters "have less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice." Id. § 1973(b).
119. See Betts, supra note 3, at 18. But see Katherine White et al., The Demographics
of the Judiciary: No Longer a Bastion of White Male Democrats, N.C. INSIGHT, Sept.
1990, at 39,39 (discussing the increasing number of African-Americans on the bench).
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staggered terms of office and multi-judge districts, particularly in
large urban counties."0 These practices diluted the voting power of
African-Americans in judicial elections. 2' Therefore, even though
African-Americans comprised the majority in certain areas within
judicial districts, they were unable to consistently elect candidates of
their own choosing.1 22
By 1987, a number of factors forced the General Assembly to
enact legislation that redrew the district lines for superior court
judgeships in a manner that would benefit African-American judicial
candidates.'" One factor was two lawsuits that raised various voting
rights issues under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, specifically with
regard to North Carolina's judicial election laws. 124  The new
restructuring legislation addressed many of the issues raised by the
African-American plaintiffs and sought to render moot two still-
pending lawsuits.'2
In the first case, Haith v. Martin, ' 6 African-American voters
challenged several state legislative acts passed in the 1960s and 1970s
that created new superior court judgeships. 2 7 One act also required
120. Cf. James C. Drennan et al., Courts, in NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1987, at
48, 49-50 (Joseph S. Ferrell ed., 1987) [hereinafter N.C. LEG. 1987] (discussing judicial
redistricting in response to challenges to the Voting Rights Act).
121. Cf. Anna M. Scruggs et al., Recent Voting Rights Act Challenges To Judicial
Elections, 79 JUDICATURE 34, 34 (1995) (discussing challenges to judicial elections under
the Voting Rights Act in 15 states). If multiple candidates are elected from one judicial
district in a plurality election, a minority group is able to concentrate all of their votes on
one candidate-a process known as "single-shot voting"-and thus better ensure minority
representation on the bench. See M. Elaine Hammond, Comment, Toward a More
Colorblind Society?: Congressional Redistricting After Shaw v. Hunt and Bush v. Vera, 75
N.C. L. REV. 2151, 2159 n.64 (1997) (citing Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A
Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 23-25 (Bernard Grofman &
Chandler Davidson eds., 1992)). However, when staggered terms of office are allowed,
only one judgeship may be on the ballot during any given election. See id. Therefore,
minority groups cannot concentrate their votes on a chosen candidate and are very
limited in their ability to elect their own candidate to the bench. See id.
122. Cf N.C. LEG. 1987, supra note 120, at 49 (discussing allegations that the then-
current elections procedures violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because they diluted
African-Americans' ability to elect their own candidates).
123. See infra notes 125-51 and accompanying text (discussing the developments which
led to the legislation); Act of June 29, 1987, ch. 509, § 1, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 769, 769
(eliminating staggered terms for superior court judges and redrawing district lines to
eliminate numerous multi-judge districts).
124. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 28; infra notes 126-50 and accompanying text
(discussing North Carolina cases challenging judicial election laws).
125. See N.C. LEG. 1987, supra note 120, at 49.
126. 618 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.C. 1985), affd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986).
127. See id. at 411-12. The district plan for superior court judgeships had been drawn
in 1955 and set out thirty judicial districts, with all but six of these districts including more
than one county. See N.C. LEG. 1987, supra note 120, at 49. The legislative acts in
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certain superior court judges to run for designated ("numbered")
seats within their districts instead of running at-large." The
plaintiffs claimed that North Carolina had failed to submit these
voting changes to the federal government for preclearance under § 5
of the Voting Rights Act, 29 which requires certain jurisdictions with a
history of low minority-voter turnout in past elections to obtain prior
approval from the federal government before implementing any
change that affects voting. 3  The court agreed with the plaintiff's
claim,13' and in compliance with the court's decision, the state
submitted the judicial restructuring acts to the Justice Department
for preclearance. 32 The Justice Department determined that the
numbered seating law, as well as the creation of new judgeships in six
districts, violated the Voting Rights Act because both resulted in
staggered terms for judges within the same districts. 33 In conjunction
with the numbered seating law, these staggered terms effectively
eliminated minority voters' ability to elect minority candidates
because minority voters could not concentrate their voting power on
a single candidate in a multi-judge race. 34
North Carolina conceded that the numbered seat requirement
created some voting rights concerns' 35 and the General Assembly
eliminated that provision from the state's election laws. 36 However,
at the urging of the state's superior court judges, 37 the state attorney
general challenged the Justice Department's decision on the
staggered term issue in North Carolina v. United States. 3 Both sides
expended a great deal of effort on the suit prior to trial, which by
question had divided four of the multi-county districts into two districts containing one or
more counties each, bringing the total number of superior court judicial districts to 34.
See Act of June 29, 1987, ch. 509, § 1, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 769, 769; see also N.C. LEG.
1987, supra note 120, at 49 (discussing district plan for superior court).
128. See Act of Apr. 15, 1965, ch. 262, § 1, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 297,297.
129. See Haith, 618 F. Supp. at 411. Forty of North Carolina's counties are required to
submit any changes in voting laws to the Justice Department for preclearance. See id. at
412.
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994); see also N.C. LEG. 1987, supra note 120, at 50-51
(describing the preclearance process).
131. See Haith, 618 F. Supp. at 414.
132- See Drennan, supra note 66, at 28-29.
133. See id. The newly created judgeships were put on different electoral cycles than
the existing judgeships in the same districts, resulting in the staggered terms. See id.
134. See id.; supra note 121 (discussing single-shot voting).
135. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 28-29.
136. See Act of July 9, 1986, ch. 957, § 1, 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws 267, 267.
137. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 29.
138. No. 86-1048-CIV-5 (D.D.C. filed June 5, 1986). The method for challenging the
Justice Department's decision was to file a declaratory judgment action in the U.S.
District Court in Washington, D.C. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 29.
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every indication was going to be hotly contested. 139 However, North
Carolina v. United States never reached trial. The North Carolina
Attorney General dropped the suit for a number of reasons. First,
the seven sitting judges whose judgeships had not been precleared by
the Justice Department became uneasy with the idea of prolonged
litigation.' 4 The lawsuit cast the validity of their elections in doubt,
and any new elections would be delayed until the controversy was
settled.' Further, parties appearing in court were questioning the
validity of the judges' actions. a42
In Alexander v. Martin, 3 another suit raising concerns similar to
those raised in Haith, the state chairman of the NAACP challenged
North Carolina's method for electing judges under § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.'" The NAACP contended that staggered terms and the
use of large multi-judge districts in the primaries prevented African-
Americans from successfully seeking nominations for superior court
judgeships. 45 The plaintiffs also alleged that the statewide election of
superior court judges discouraged African-Americans from seeking
office. 46 The NAACP sought much broader remedies in Alexander
than those at issue in Haith.147 Specifically, the organization wanted
North Carolina to redraw judicial boundaries to create smaller
districts that would be more likely to elect African-American
judges.'" The plaintiffs also sought the end of statewide elections for
superior court judges in favor of district elections.149 Thus, Alexander
139. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 29.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142 See id. Criminal defendants had begun to file motions raising the issue of whether
the seven sitting judges even had the authority of their office. See id.
143. No. 86-1048-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. filed Oct. 2, 1986).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994). Section 2, as amended in 1982, "prohibits election
practices that result in racial discrimination." Scruggs et al., supra note 121, at 34
(emphasis added). In one of the stranger combinations in North Carolina politics, the
NAACP was represented by an attorney who had previously run for state attorney
general as the Republican candidate. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 29.
145. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 29-30.
146. See id. at 30.
147. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, at issue in Haith, applies only to new voting
practices in designated areas, and its remedies are limited solely to preventing those
changes from taking place. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c); see also supra notes 126-42 and
accompanying text (discussing Haith). However, § 2 applies throughout the United States
and is violated when any voting practice abridges the rights of minorities to elect
representatives of their own choosing. See id. § 1973(a). Further, § 2 provides much
broader remedies, and can be proactive rather than responsive. See supra note 118 and
accompanying text (discussing §§ 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
148. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 30.
149. See id. Superior court judges are no longer elected statewide. See Act of Aug. 2,
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was broader in scope than Haith and had the potential to affect North
Carolina's entire judicial system.'50
A coalition formed between African-American legislators, the
judges affected by Haith, and those fearful of the potential remedies
from Alexander.5' The resulting legislation ("Chapter 509")
implemented major changes to the district lines used to determine
residence and to nominate superior court judges.52 In six large urban
counties, Chapter 509 subdivided the former single-county, multi-
judge districts into two or more districts with at least one judgeship
having a majority of minority voters.'53 Chapter 509 also split ten
other multi-county, multi-judge districts into twenty single-judge
districts, with two containing a majority of minority voters. 54
Staggered terms for all judges in each new district were eliminated.55
The passage of Chapter 509156 eliminated the need to resort to
legal means to secure greater minority representation on the bench in
North Carolina. The plaintiffs dismissed their complaint in
Alexander because they were satisfied with the General Assembly's
solution to the problem 5 7  True to its purpose, Chapter 509
increased the number of African-Americans on the superior court
1996, ch. 9, § 1, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536, 536.
150. In particular, Democratic judges who resided in districts that were predominantly
Republican were concerned about the possible elimination of statewide elections. See
Drennan, supra note 66, at 30. These elections essentially guaranteed their positions by
diluting the Republican votes from their home districts with the vast statewide
Democratic majority.
151. See id.
152- See Act of June 29,1987, ch. 509, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 769.
153. See id. at 770-73; N.C. LEG. 1987, supra note 120, at 50.
154. See Act of June 29, 1987, ch. 509, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 769. For example, the
former Seventh district, which had included three counties, was divided into three
separate districts. See N.C. LEG. 1987, supra note 120, at 50. Nash County made up one
district, while Wilson and Edgecombe Counties were split into two districts, one district
with a majority of white voters and the other with a majority of African-American voters.
See id.
155. See Act of June 29, 1987, ch. 509, § 1, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 769, 776-80. The
staggered terms were eliminated by extending the term which expired first to coincide
with the term expiring later. See N.C. LEG. 1987, supra note 120, at 50.
156. The act itself was subject to preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965. See N.C. LEG. 1987, supra note 120, at 50. The U.S. Justice Department precleared
the act on September 25, 1987. See id. at 51. North Carolina Governor Jim Martin
challenged the reorganization of the superior court under Chapter 509 in State ex rel.
Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989). The North Carolina Supreme
Court determined that Chapter 509 served a beneficial public purpose by bringing North
Carolina's election laws into compliance with the Voting Rights Act and was therefore
valid under the state constitution. See id. at 456,385 S.E.2d at 479.
157. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 31.
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bench. 8  If there had been any question as to whether the Voting
Rights Act applied to judicial elections, the United States Supreme
Court emphatically resolved the question with three decisions in
1991, determining that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 does apply to
judicial elections.5 9
2. Statewide Versus Local Election of Superior Court Judges
Although the General Assembly has had the authority to
approve local elections for superior court judges since 1868,1'0 these
candidates were elected on a statewide basis until 1994.161 Prior to
that time, only nominations were decided at the local level. 6 The
Republican Party had taken issue with this system for decades 63 and
had assisted African-Americans in challenging the manner in which
North Carolina Superior Court judges were elected. 64 Although the
NAACP was satisfied with the 1987 reform of the election system
under Chapter 509, which primarily benefited African-Americans, 165
Republicans were not; consequently, in 1988, the state Republican
Party brought suit against the Governor and the Board of Elections
158. By 1990, 24 African-American judges were elected to the bench in North
Carolina, including three appellate judges. See White et al., supra note 119, at 42. By
1995, 35 African-Americans were serving as judges, constituting 12% of North Carolina's
judiciary (14 of these 35 sat on the superior court bench). See Betts, supra note 60, at 322.
159. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (holding that § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act was violated in a case involving a Louisiana challenge to the election of
supreme court justices in a multi-member district); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 655
(1991) (holding that judicial elections should have been enjoined when the Attorney
General of Louisiana brought forth objections under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act and, in
addition, these judgeships had not been precleared); Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney
Gen. of Tex., 501 U.S. 419, 428 (1991) (holding that the at-large method of electing trial
court judges in certain Texas counties violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act); see also
supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing §§ 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
160. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 21. The General Assembly retained this
authority through a similar provision in the current constitution. See N.C. CONST. art. IV,
§ 16 ("Regular Judges of the Superior Court may be elected by the qualified voters of the
State or by the voters of their respective districts, as the General Assembly may
prescribe."). The General Assembly did not exercise this power until the 1996 legislative
session. See infra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
161. See BRANNON, supra note 81, at 12 (describing the selection of superior court
judges as of August 1993).
162. See id.
163. See N.C. LEG. 1987, supra note 120, at 49. The Republicans justifiably contended
that the statewide election of superior court judges unfairly worked to the advantage of
Democratic candidates. See White et al., supra note 119, at 40. A 1980 survey of
appellate and superior court judges showed that 84 out of 85 judges were Democrats,
despite the fact that 30% of North Carolinians were registered Republicans. See id.
164. See supra notes 126-50 (discussing cases which challenged the methods of electing
superior court judges in North Carolina as unfair to racial minorities).
165. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
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challenging the statewide election of superior court judges. 166 The
original suit eventually was dismissed for lack of venue,167 but the
Republicans continued pressing the issue in a lengthy legal battle.68
Finally, in Republican Party v. Hunt,169 the Republicans met with
some success: the Eastern District of North Carolina agreed that
statewide elections of superior court judges were unconstitutional
because such elections diluted Republican voting powerY.70  Reality
seemed to support the court's conclusion because only one
Republican had ever been elected to a superior court judgeship in a
statewide election.71 The court ordered that candidates for superior
court judgeships be elected by voters in their home districts.' But
the court also provided that the candidates appear on the statewide
ballot in case the decision was reversed by a higher court, thereby
voiding the results of the district elections and requiring new
statewide elections to determine the actual winner.'73 Ironically,
Republican candidates in North Carolina did exceptionally well in
the 1994 general elections, winning all four court of appeals seats and
carrying the statewide vote in eight superior court races. 74
166. See Republican Party v. Martin, 682 F. Supp. 834 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
167. See id. at 837.
168. See Republican Party v. Martin, No. 88-263-CIV-5-F (E.D.N.C. transferred Mar.
30, 1988) (dismissing plaintiff's action which alleged that North Carolina's method of
electing superior court judges statewide was discriminatory against Republicans and
therefore unconstitutional by an order entered June 6, 1991, and finding that the issue
raised was a non-justiciable political question), rev'd, 980 F.2d 943, 961 (4th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied sub nom. Republican Party v. Hunt, 991 F.2d 1202, 1203 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 828 (1993), modified on remand, 841 F. Supp. 722, 733 (E.D.N.C. 1994),
affd as modified sub nom. Republican Party v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 27 F.3d 563
(4th Cir. 1994), remanded sub nom. Republican Party v. Hunt, 77 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 1996).
169. 841 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.N.C. 1994), affd as modified sub nom. Republican Party of
N.C. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 27 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 1994), remanded sub nom.
Republican Party v. Hunt, 77 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 1996). The plaintiffs in Hunt again
asserted that Republicans could elect their own candidates in several areas if superior
court elections were held district-wide rather than statewide. See id. at 726. Because the
Democratic Party held a wide margin in voter registration, the Republicans argued that
the Democratic candidates would always win in statewide elections See id.
170. See id. at 732 ("Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that they have been and
will continue to be irreparably harmed by the present superior court electoral process.").
171. See id. at 726. Prior to 1988, no Republican candidate had won a statewide
judicial election in the 20th century. See JSSC, supra note 3, at 6.
172- See Hunt, 841 F. Supp. at 733-34.
173. See id. at 734.
174. See Joseph Neff, Republicans Win Every Race for Seats on Appellate Courts,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 9, 1994, at B3 [hereinafter Republicans Win].
The new election procedure actually disadvantaged the Republican party in two superior
court races in Eastern North Carolina in which the Republican candidates rode the
overall success of their party to a victory on the statewide ballot, but lost close races to
Democratic opponents in their home district. See Hunt, 841 F. Supp. at 734. Republican
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In light of the success of Republican candidates in the 1994
elections, the Fourth Circuit reconsidered Hunt in early 1996.175
Before the court of appeals, the State Board of Elections argued that
the Republican Party had "failed to carry its burden of showing
unconstitutional discriminatory effects resulting from the statewide
election of superior court judges." 176 The Board of Elections also
contended that in making the ruling the district court ignored the
growing strength of the Republican Party.177 The Republican Party
argued that the court of appeals should not overturn the decision,
claiming that it would be inappropriate to consider the results of the
1994 election.17 The court of appeals determined that the results of
the 1994 elections "were directly at odds with the recent prediction
by the district court that Republican electoral exclusion would
continue unabated into the future." '17 9  The court of appeals
remanded Hunt to the district court for further consideration. 10
This reversal cast doubt on the outcome of the 1994 elections
and, with the 1996 general elections quickly approaching, left
undecided the question of how North Carolina could choose its
superior court judges."'1 In the 1996 legislative session, the General
Assembly acted to settle the uncertainty by validating the results of
the 1994 election and by declaring that all superior court judges
would be elected from local districts starting in 1996.182 The General
Assembly also declared that, beginning in 1998, all superior court
judges would be elected in non-partisan elections." 3
success has continued, and as of 1995, there were 44 Republican judges, making up 15%
of the judiciary. See Betts, supra note 60, at 322.
175. See Republican Party v. Hunt, 1996 WL 60439, at *1 (4th Cir. 1996). In the 1994
general elections, Republican candidates were victorious in eight statewide superior court
races. See Judicial Election Case Remanded in Light of 1994 Republican Wins, N.C. LAW.
WKLY., Feb. 26, 1996, at 1, 1 [hereinafter 1994 Judicial Election]. Before 1994, only one
Republican had won in the entire century. See id. at 4.
176. Hunt, 1996 WL 60439, at *3.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at *4.
181. See N.C. LEG. 1996, supra note 2, at 3-3.
18Z See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, § 1, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536, 536;
see also infra notes 332-36 and accompanying text (discussing 1996 legislative action in
the General Assembly). Recall that the General Assembly had possessed the power to
declare that superior court judges were to be elected by the local district since 1868. See
supra note 160 and accompanying text.
183. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, § 1, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536, 536;
infra notes 332-36 and accompanying text.
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B. Growing Political Nature of Judges
Another serious problem with North Carolina's judicial election
system is the growing political nature of judges and judicial
elections,184 a problem which manifests itself in a number of different
ways. Observers view partisan elections as inconsistent with an
independent and accountable judiciary.' 5  The back-and-forth
exchanges so common in non-judicial political races threaten to
demean the courts and undermine their respect.1"6 Moreover, public
confidence in the fairness of judicial. decisions wanes as elections
force judges to raise large amounts of money for political
campaigns.'1 These concerns all have been realized recently to some
extent in North Carolina.
1. Fiercely Contested Judicial Elections
Prior to the 1980s, the Democratic Party completely dominated
the ranks of the judicial branch in North Carolina."s  Although
judges officially were chosen through partisan elections, in reality
most Democratic candidates rarely faced any opposition, and then
only in party primaries.8 9 As a result, judicial elections were
184. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 6 ("[W]e can expect increasing criticism of the courts
as part of campaigns, which will lead to even more negative perceptions and greater
public distrust. We can also expect, as we already are beginning to see, the restraints on
the political decorum of the past begin to fade in these elections.").
185. See infra notes 188-205 and accompanying text (discussing the fiercely contested
nature of judicial races in North Carolina).
186. See infra notes 206-25 and accompanying text (discussing the lifting of the gag
order which allows judges to express publicly their views on political issues).
187. See infra notes 226-48 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing costs of
judicial campaigns).
188. See Exum, supra note 71, at 5.
189. See H. Park Helms, The Case for Judicial Election Reform, N.C. INSIGHT, June
1987, at 22, 22 ("[O]nce [judges] were nominated in the Democratic primary, the
politicking was over and they ran without opposition-and seldom with an issue-in the
general election in November."). Thus, North Carolina's method of selecting judges was
an elective system in name only:
Almost all judges have been Democrats, initially appointed [to fill vacancies] by
Democratic Governors, and, once appointed, almost never challenged
electorally. Democratic judges were rarely challenged in Democratic primaries
because the nature of judicial elections made it difficult to identify any real
issues and any real reasons for ousting an incumbent judge .... [They] were
rarely challenged by Republicans for the same reason[s] ... [and because]
Democratic judicial candidates always won [statewide elections]. [Thus,] the
system for judicial selection and retention in North Carolina has for the most
part and for almost all judges been gubernatorial appointment and tenure for life
or [until] retirement.
Exum, supra note 71, at 5.
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essentially free of partisan political pressure. 9 " However, as the
Republican party gained popularity among North Carolina voters in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, it became clear that uncontested
judicial elections would no longer be the rule in the emerging two-
party state.'9' For the first time, characteristics more common to
regular political contests, such as active campaigning, aggressive
political advertising, and closely contested races, became prevalent in
North Carolina's judicial elections.19
For example, the 1986 race for chief justice of the supreme court,
in which two supreme court justices faced each other, became "the
most bitter election in N.C. Supreme Court history."'193 Many
observers contend that the race, eventually won by Democrat James
Exum, served as an indication of the increased partisan nature of
judicial elections in North Carolina. 94 One of the primary concerns
in this race was the role of a special interest group, headed by a
former Governor, which fiercely attacked Justice Exum's record on
the death penalty.'95 Specifically, the group featured families of
murder victims in news conferences in which they criticized Justice
Exum's decisions. 196 Exum's opponent, outspoken in her criticism of
190. See Helms, supra note 189, at 22.
191. See Judicial Races Drawing Hopeful GOP Challengers, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Apr. 1,
1996, at 1, 4 [hereinafter GOP Challengers]. Currently, many incumbent Democratic
judges even face challengers from within their own party in the primary before
confronting a Republican opponent in the general election. See id. Contested primaries,
of course, make for longer campaign seasons and call for heftier campaign budgets.
19Z Cf. NORTH CAROLINA COURTS COMM'N, 1987 REPORT OF THE COURTS
COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2-5 [hereinafter 1987 COURTS COMMISSION]
(expressing concerns about the method of judicial selection in light of the judicial
campaigns of 1986).
193. Betts, supra note 3, at 20. When then-Chief Justice Joseph Branch retired from
office in mid-1986, Republican Governor Jim Martin appointed a fellow Republican,
Associate Justice Rhoda Billings, to fill the vacancy. See id. at 19. The appointment of
Billings violated the longstanding tradition, used since 1900, of elevating the senior
associate justice to the top spot. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 27. In this case, the next
person in line was Associate Justice James Exum, a Democrat. See id. Governor Jim
Hunt had been the last governor to abide by this tradition when in 1977, somewhat
against his will, he appointed Joseph Branch to the head position instead of Hunt's
college friend, Phil Carlton. See Betts, supra note 3, at 19. Billings served as the chief
justice from September until the November election, when the law required her to run for
the remainder of Branch's term. See id. Justice Exum resigned his post to campaign for
the position as well. See id. at 20.
194. See Helms, supra note 189, at 22-23; Robert Moog, Campaign Financing for North
Carolina's Appellate Courts, 76 JUDICATURE 68, 69-70 (1992); Ruffin, supra note 8, at J1.
195. Former Republican Governor Jim Holshouser headed a group known as the
Citizens for a Conservative Court, which vigorously attacked Justice Exum's record,
particularly with regard to his stance on the death penalty. See Betts, supra note 3, at 20.
196. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 28.
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the tactics, noted that the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited Exum
from responding.197 Nevertheless, Exum prevailed, due in part to a
backlash of voters who resented the politicizing of the courts.198
However, the controversial campaign had upset the trend of lightly
contested judicial elections, and with the Republican party growing in
power, the future promised more of the same.
The 1990 judicial elections displayed another undesirable
characteristic typical of non-judicial political campaigns: aggressive
political advertisements. 19 9  Republican candidates asserted that
aggressive campaign advertisements were necessary to highlight
differences between the candidates. 20 Democrats argued that these
tactics resembled then-presidential candidate George Bush's Willie
Horton advertisement.20 1 Once again, non-judicial officials entered
the campaign fray as the chairman of the State Republican Party
openly criticized the Democratic supreme court as soft on crime in
television advertisements. 2
The general elections of 1994, in which a record number of
judicial races were contested throughout the state, firmly cemented
North Carolina as a two-party state in which Republicans were more
197. See id. The North Carolina Supreme Court prescribes ethical guidelines for
judges in the Code of Judicial Conduct pursuant to authority granted by the North
Carolina Constitution. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13; N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr
(1998) [hereinafter 1998 JUDICIAL CODE]. Many states, including North Carolina,
adopted similar codes as derivatives of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See Michael
Dayton, Supreme Court Strikes Gag Rule from Code of Judicial Conduct, N.C. LAW.
WKLY., July 28, 1997, at 1, 1.
198. See Betts, supra note 3, at 20. Justice Exum's victory was the first defeat of a
sitting chief justice since Democrat Walter Clark defeated Republican Chief Justice
David Furches in 1902. See id.
199. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 41.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 41 n.41 (citing Ruffin, supra note 8, at Ji). For example, one television
advertisement produced by the Republican Party specifically criticized several supreme
court opinions. See id. The most prominent of the cases in question dealt with the
granting of a new trial to a defendant sentenced to death. See id. The supreme court
recognized a violation of the defendant's right to be present while jurors were questioned
by the judge about the jurors' request to be excused. See id. Allen Adams, the campaign
director for Democratic judicial candidates, criticized the Republican campaign strategy
as an attempt to "Willie Horton-ize" the election. See id.
202- See id. at 41. At that time, the Code of Judicial Conduct still prohibited sitting
judges or candidates from any announcement of their stances on political issues. See id.;
see also 1998 JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 197, Canon 7 (setting out amended rules which
now allow a judicial candidate to announce her stance). Consequently, non-candidates
could freely criticize the decisions of the sitting judges, while the incumbents were
precluded from defending or explaining their own records. See infra notes 206-25 and
accompanying text (discussing the "announce" clause, which prohibits judges from
expressing political views during campaigns).
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than capable of competing.2 3  Republicans captured the one
available seat on the supreme court, both available seats on the court
of appeals, and eight of the ten available superior court judgeships.",
The 1994 elections marked the end of apolitical, uncontested judicial
races and signaled that future judicial campaigns may resemble the
less dignified legislative and gubernatorial elections. °5
2. Gag Rule Lifted
Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct contains restrictions on
political activity deemed inappropriate for a judicial officer. 6 Until
recently, this included the "announce" clause, or gag rule,21 which
prohibited judges from stating their opinions on "disputed legal or
political issues. '23 One of the intended and actual effects of this rule
was to limit what a judge or candidate could say while campaigning
for office, thereby minimizing the political nature of judicial races.209
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court recently amended
Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and dropped the gag rule.21°
This decision to delete the "announce" clause came on the heels
of a constitutional challenge to the clause in federal court.211 During
203. See Record Number of Judicial Races Contested, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 21,
1994, at 1, 1.
204. See Republicans Win, supra note 174, at A3. In addition to being known for the
Republican party's record success at the polls, the judicial elections of 1994 were also
known for the record amount of campaign expenditures. See infra notes 226-48 and
accompanying text (discussing increased cost of judicial campaigns).
205. Cf. GOP Challengers, supra note 191, at 4 (discussing the increased presence of
Republican challengers to Democratic judges in the 1996 judicial elections). Buoyed by
the Republican success of 1994, Republican challengers to incumbent Democratic judges
emerged in force during the 1996 elections, especially for district court judgeships. See id.
206. Prohibited activities include soliciting funds, making contributions, or making
speeches for political candidates or organizations or holding a leadership position in such
a group. See 1998 JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 197, Canon 7A(1).
207. See Dayton, supra note 197, at 1. Until amended in 1997, Canon 7B(1)(c) of the
Code of Judicial Conduct stated that a judicial candidate "[s]hould not make pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or
misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact." N.C. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1997) [hereinafter 1997 JUDICIAL CODE]
(emphasis added).
208. 1997 JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 207, Canon 7B(1)(c).
209. See Dayton, supra note 197, at 4.
210. See 1998 JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 197, Cannon 7B(1)(c).
211. See Brooks v. N.C. State Bar, No. 2:96CV00857 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 18, 1996) (order
granting temporary restraining order). For a more thorough discussion of North
Carolina's decision to drop the announce clause, see Amy M. Craig, Comment, The
Burial of an Impartial Judicial System: The Lifting of Restrictions on Judicial Candidate
Speech in North Carolina, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 413 (1998).
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an unsuccessful bid for a district court judgeship, attorney Mark
Brooks announced in a candidates' forum that he was "pro-life. '2 12
When the North Carolina State Bar sought to sanction him for
violating Canon 7, Brooks sued in federal court claiming that the gag
rule was an overbroad restriction on free speech in violation of his
constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.2"3
The judge issued a temporary restraining order in Brooks' favor.214
Although this order was later dissolved for procedural reasons,21 5 the
court made it clear that it did not favor "broad and vague restrictions
on free speech" and that "citizens have the right to be informed
about the qualifications and views of candidates for judicial office. 2 16
The court's reasoning comports with other courts' decisions
regarding similar challenges to judicial gag rules in other states.217
Consequently, Canon 7 now allows judicial candidates in North
Carolina to reveal their stances on such issues as abortion, the death
212. See Ertel Berry, Judicial Candidate Takes on Gag Rule, N.C. LAv. WKLY., Oct.
28, 1996, at 1, 1.
213. See id.
214. Brooks v. North Carolina State Bar, No. 2:96CV00857 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 28, 1996)
(order dissolving temporary restraining order).
215. The court declined to extend the temporary restraining order through the
November elections because the Judicial Standards Commission, which is responsible for
regulating the campaign conduct of incumbent judges, had not been joined as a necessary
party to the lawsuit. See Gag Rule Fight On Hold, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Nov. 4, 1996, at 1,
2. Only the State Bar, which incorporated the Judicial Code into its Rules of Professional
Conduct, would have been affected by the restraining order. See id. Therefore, the
injunction would have freed only non-incumbents from the gag rule, leaving incumbent
judges still prohibited from announcing their views during the campaign. See id.
216. See Brooks v. North Carolina State Bar, No. 2:96CV00857 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 28,
1996) (order dissolving temporary restraining order). This case was latter settled for
$10,000. See Michael Dayton, Bar, JSC Pay $10,000 To Settle Gag Rule Lawsuit, N.C.
LAV. WKLY., Nov. 3, 1997, at 1, 1.
217. See, e.g., Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a rule regulating the speech of judicial candidates violated the First
Amendment); ACLU v. Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp 1094, 1099-100 (N.D. Fla. 1990)
(granting preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the "announce" clause).
But see Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137, 142-44 (3d Cir.
1991) (recognizing state interest in assuring that judges are and appear to be impartial).
The U.S. Supreme Court has long made it clear that the First Amendment's guarantees of
free speech apply with particular vigor in political campaigns, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1975), including campaigns of state elective officials, see Brown v. Hartlage,
456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment forbids the states from
barring candidates for public office from promising to conduct their office in a way that
benefits a particular class of voters). However, the Supreme Court has not decided
whether the particular limitations on judicial election campaign speech in the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct violate the First Amendment. See Matthew J. O'Hara, Note,
Restriction of Judicial Election Candidates' Free Speech Rights After Buckley. A
Compelling Constitutional Limitation? 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 197,198 (1994).
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penalty, and victim's rights.218 Observers disagree as to whether this
change will help or hurt the quality of the judiciary. On one hand,
the rule change will allow judges to express their personal views on
current legal and political issues of the day, thus resulting in a better-
informed electorate and increasing judicial accountability.219 Despite
these advantages, many scholars do not favor any relaxation of rules
prohibiting judges from discussing issues that may be litigated in the
judges' courtrooms.' Certainly, many members of the judiciary fear
that the lifting of the gag rule will force them to run more partisan
and aggressive campaigns akin to those run by other elected
officials.221
The real difficulty with judicial candidates discussing views on
disputed legal and political issues is that the voting public might
believe that such opinions are relevant to the performance of judicial
duties, which in theory they are not.' Consequently, judges might
feel compelled to ensure that their decisions conform to their
campaign promises. Likewise, candidates who discuss their
218. See Dayton, supra note 197, at 1.
219. See Brooks v. North Carolina State Bar, No. 2:96CV00857 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 28,
1996) (order dissolving temporary restraining order); see also O'Hara, supra note 217, at
236 (suggesting that reasoned free speech by judicial candidates may be in the interest of
a well-informed electorate); Michele Radosevich, Comment, Toward Meaningful Judicial
Elections: A Case for Reform of Canon 7, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 139, 149-54
(1993) (arguing that the muzzle should be taken off of judges because it undermines the
accountability intended to be achieved through judicial elections).
220. See MCFADDEN, supra note 41, at 89. See generally Neil K. Sethi, Comment, The
Elusive Middle Ground: A Proposed Constitutional Speech Restriction For Judicial
Selection, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1997) (proposing a new speech restriction rule for
judicial elections that should not be deemed a First Amendment violation).
221. For example, Chief Justice Burley Mitchell warned that the change "'will
probably cause judicial elections to look more like elections for the General Assembly...
with some of the same campaign tactics. I don't think that it will be healthy for the
judiciary.' " Dayton, supra note 197, at 1 (quoting Chief Justice Mitchell). However,
some restraints on free speech will still apply. For instance, "[c]andidates will not be able
to stake themselves out on particular cases. Nor will they be permitted to make promises
about their conduct in office-other than to say [they will] be impartial." Id.; see also
1998 JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 197, Canon 7 (discussing other restrictions on candidate
actions during judicial campaigns).
222. See MCFADDEN, supra note 41, at 89.
223. See Sethi, supra note 220, at 719-20 ("When a judicial candidate makes a
statement regarding her beliefs on an important public issue ... and is subsequently
elected, there is an impermissible risk that the judge will no longer view that issue
impartially."). As elected officials, judges already respond to public opinion concerning
sensitive political and legal issues; perhaps increasingly they will base their decisions on
political concerns if they have staked out specific positions on the campaign trail. Such a
situation could raise serious issues about the independent role of the judiciary and its duty
to act as a countermajoritarian force. See generally Sara Wyche Higgins, Note, State v.
Jennings: Public Fervor, the North Carolina Supreme Court, and Society's Ultimate
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personal views will appear to have pre-judged particular types of
issues, even if the candidates maintain their neutrality while on the
bench.224 Because the perception that justice is being served is often
as important as the reality, the integrity of the courts likely will be
threatened when judicial candidates begin to assert their views. 2 5
3. Increasing Campaign Costs
Perhaps the most disturbing trend in judicial elections in North
Carolina is the growing importance of money in the electoral process.
Judicial campaigns were once low-proffle contests that involved little
campaigning and small amounts of money.2 6  But the cost of
campaigning for a seat on the bench in North Carolina is
increasing,227 forcing many judges to "manage professional, extensive,
and expensive campaigns in order to attract a statewide
electorate."' The movement of North Carolina to a two-party state,
with competitive elections between Republican and Democratic
candidates, has played a significant role in this increase.229 The rising
campaign costs in North Carolina parallel a potentially dangerous
trend seen around the country.230
The costs of judicial elections in 1986 and 1994 were particularly
Punishment, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1672 (1994) (arguing that the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Jennings allowed the death penalty to stand under constitutionally questionable
circumstances). Given the "current popular sentiment demanding harsh and swift
punishment for violent offenders," Higgins suggests that North Carolina's Supreme Court
justices "may be responding more to public sentiment than to reasoned judicial principles;
[thus,] Jennings may lead one to ask whether an elected judiciary may be counted on to
protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants in the face of political winds
calling for constriction of those rights." Id. at 1690-91.
224. See MCFADDEN, supra note 41, at 89.
225. Cf. 1987 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 192, at 3 ("[Judges] are impaired in
their ability to be judges if the court system in which they work is perceived as political.").
226. See Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections:
Examining the First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L.
& POL'Y REV. 71, 75 (1997) (discussing previous low cost of judicial campaigns across the
country).
227. See Exum, supra note 71, at 6. In 1986, total spending for statewide judicial
races-supreme court, court of appeals, and superior court-exceeded $716,000. See id.
This total represented a $145,000 increase over the totals for statewide judicial elections
in 1980, 1982, and 1984 combined. See id.
228. Traciel V. Reid, PAC Participation in North Carolina Supreme Court Elections, 80
JUDICATURE 21,21 (1996).
229. See Moog, supra note 194, at 68.
230. See Levien & Fatka, supra note 226, at 72. Levien and Fatka argue that
escalating campaign expenditures are undermining public confidence in the political
process. See id. This problem is particularly true in judicial elections in which increased
costs of judicial campaigns in combination with the rising demand for campaign
contributions are "creating the perception, if not the reality, of impropriety." Id.
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excessive 231 In the 1986 election, Republican Governor Jim Martin
mounted an aggressive campaign to fill five of the seven seats on the
North Carolina Supreme Court with Republicans. 2 Special interest
groups sought to characterize the sitting Democratic court as being
soft on the death penalty.3 3 Democratic candidates responded with
television, radio, and newspaper advertisements emphasizing the
importance of judicial independence and integrity.23 In all,
candidates for the supreme court spent $367,988 in the 1986
campaign.?35 In 1994, only two North Carolina Supreme Court seats
were up for election, and yet the total campaign expenditures for
those races soared to nearly $600,000.236 Republican Bob Orr spent
almost $130,000 in winning a seat on the supreme court, while his
Democratic opponent spent over $240,000 in a losing effort. 7
Expensive campaigns were not limited to the supreme court that
year, as Republican Mark Martin and his opponent for a seat on the
court of appeals together spent over $300,000.231 A recent study
indicates that although judicial election spending has not "escalated
out of control," the cost of judicial campaigns in North Carolina will
continue to rise as the number of contested and competitive judicial
elections increases.
239
Rising campaign costs create difficulties because judicial
candidates become increasingly dependent on campaign expenditures
and must devote more time and effort to fundraising.240 The Code of
Judicial Conduct, however, already limits a judge's ability to raise
231. See Reid, supra note 228, at 24.
232 See Moog, supra note 194, at 69; see also supra notes 193-98 and accompanying
text (discussing the 1986 race for chief justice of the supreme court and the attacks on the
political views of the Democratic candidate).
233. See Betts, supra note 3, at 20.
234. See Reid, supra note 228, at 23.
235. See id. at 24. As mentioned previously, this total represented a significant
increase over all three previous elections combined. See supra note 227. Furthermore,
the 1986 totals did not even include funds spent by the Campaign for a Conservative
Court, the conservative group headed by a former Governor, which campaigned against
the incumbent Democrats. Cf. Reid, supra note 228, at 24.
236. See Reid, supra note 228, at 24.
237. See id.
238. See Joseph Neff, Change in Selection of Judges Advances, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), June 14,1995, at A3.
239. See Moog, supra note 194, at 76.
240. See Levien & Fatka, supra note 226, at 75. Some studies indicate that judges in
the aggregate typically must supply from 10 to 30 percent of their own campaign funds,
often by taking out personal loans. See MCFADDEN, supra note 41, at 29-30. In the costly
1986 elections, a number of candidates for the North Carolina Supreme Court were
forced to take out loans and to rely on family assets to supplement individual
contributions. See Reid, supra note 228, at 29.
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campaign contributions.241  Nevertheless, a judicial candidate's
success depends on greater access to money. 4 Naturally, the people
most interested in giving money to judicial campaigns are attorneys243
and other groups who seek relief through the courts.244  This
increased role of money in judicial elections threatens to have an
adverse effect on judicial impartiality, whether actual or perceived. 45
It is possible that a successful judicial candidate will have to decide a
case in which an attorney and litigant appearing before him
contributed to his campaign. 46 In this situation, even if the judge is
able to remain impartial, it may appear that she cannot.47 Possible
solutions to the growing campaign finance dilemma include
implementing individual campaign contribution limits through
campaign finance laws or restricting litigants' ability to contribute to
241. See 1998 JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 197, Canon 7B(2). Like judges in most
states, North Carolina judges are prohibited from soliciting their own campaign funds
under Canon 7B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. See id.; MCFADDEN, supra note 41,
at 31. As a result, judicial candidates form committees to raise and manage their
campaign funds, theoretically insulating the candidates from "charges or suspicions of
bias." Id. at 32. In reality, however, most candidates have a working knowledge of the
supporters of their campaigns, thus rendering the rule ineffective. See id.
242. See JSSC, supra note 3, at 6. Historically, judicial races have generated less voter
and contributor interest than other elective races. See MCFADDEN, supra note 41, at 26.
Because of this low profile, fundraising for judicial candidates is more difficult.
Candidates are often forced to turn to the small segment of the electorate that takes a
special interest in judicial races, namely lawyers and members of business and
professional groups that frequently litigate. See id. at 26-27.
243. See Levien & Fatka, supra note 226, at 76. In North Carolina, most campaign
contributions to judicial candidates come from trial lawyers and businesses that often
appear before the court.' See Neff, supra note 238, at A3. Senator Fountain Odom,
sponsor of a 1995 judicial reform bill, Senate Bill 971, noted that such contributions
tended "to corrupt the image of an impartial judiciary." Id.
244. Political action committees ("PACs") have played a relatively limited role so far
in North Carolina judicial elections, with the largest contributor being North Carolina's
Academy of Trial Lawyers. See Reid, supra note 228, at 27 (noting that this organization
contributed about $48,000 to supreme court judicial campaigns over the course of four
election cycles from 1986-1994, averaging about $4,000 per candidate). However, the
increasing costs of judicial campaigns and the growing competitiveness of judicial races
will provide PACs with an incentive to become significant contributors to judicial
candidates. See id. at 22. Conservative business PACs and the North Carolina Medical
Society, which has a vested interest in the area of tort liability, may soon become heavily
involved in contributing to judicial campaigns. See id. at 28. As a result, PACs will play
an increasing role in financing judicial elections. See id. at 29. How their involvement will
change the character of judicial campaigns remains to be seen.
245. See JSSC, supra note 3, at 6-7.
246. See id. at 6.
247. See id. at 6-7. In theory such bias could be remedied by recusal, but "routine
judicial disqualification on the basis of campaign contributions would be too frequent
when fund raising is such an integral element of the judicial selection process." John W.
Reed, Judicial Selection in Michigan-Time for Change?, 75 MICH. B.J. 900, 902 (1996).
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judicial campaigns through ethical rules.24
C. Uninformed Electorate
In 1995, the North Carolina Futures Commission conducted an
in-depth public survey to determine the fitness of the judiciary in the
eyes of the people.4 9 The results showed that the general public
knows little about the courts and the judicial elective process.-25 Few
voters even knew the names of judges who sit in courthouses in their
countiesY 1 To the extent that voters do seek to inform themselves
about judicial races, their efforts largely focus only on the candidate's
party, race, or gender, but not on legal qualifications or capabilities. z
The 1974 election for chief justice of the supreme court is a notable
example of the counter-intuitive results that may occur when an
uninformed electorate selects the judiciary. Republican voters in the
primary had the option of choosing between District Court Judge
Elreta Alexander, an African-American woman and experienced
trial court judge, and James Newcombe, a fire extinguisher salesman
with neither a law degree nor any judicial experience.23 Newcombe
248. See MCFADDEN, supra note 41, at 41-46. Another possibility would be to adopt
alternative fundraising methods such as public financing, pooled funds, or mandatory
race-by-race funding agreements. See id. at 122-24.
249. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 11. The Futures Commission held public hearings,
organized focus groups, and conducted an 800-person telephone survey. See id.
250. See id. at 8. Thirty percent of those surveyed claimed "they did not know enough
about the courts to express an opinion." Id. Only 40% knew the general public elected
the supreme court. See id. Of the 60% who claimed to have voted in the 1994 election,
only half of them recalled voting for a judge. See id.
251. See Editorial, Judges on the Stump?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) July 18,
1997, at A14.
252. See id. Cf Sethi, supra note 220, at 718 (noting that as a consequence of
insufficient voter information, voters are often forced to look to a candidate's name, sex,
race, age, and/or political affiliation in making a choice). A former publisher and non-
lawyer member of the Futures Commission commented that "'[w]e are playing damn
Russian roulette with the way we select judges.'" Survey: Public in Dark About Judicial
Elections, N.C. LAw. WKLY., Nov. 6, 1995, at 1, 1 (quoting Joseph C. Doster). North
Carolina could adopt various proposals to increase the electorate's knowledge of the
judiciary. One method, for example, would be to mail informative pamphlets directly to
registered voters. For example, Alaska, California, Oregon, and Washington currently
use this practice, which voters have regarded highly. See MCFADDEN, supra note 41, at
124. The pamphlets usually include brief statements prepared by the candidates as well
the candidates' biographies and qualifications for office. See id. North Carolina has tried
this method once; during the 1990 election season, the Committee on Judicial Campaigns
of the North Carolina Bar Association published and distributed over 500,000 copies of an
informational pamphlet called a Voter Information Guide to Judicial Candidates. See
Drennan, supra note 66, at 42.
253. See Betts, supra note 3, at 15. Of course, it is possible that many voters knew that
Newcombe did not have a law degree yet voted for him anyway. However, the
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managed to win the Republican nomination, taking fifty-nine percent
of the vote, before falling to the Democratic candidate, Associate
Justice Susie Sharp, in the general election. 4
Another consequence of this ignorance about judicial candidates
is that voters may base their decisions on the candidates' party
affiliation alone.25 This type of voting can result in partisan sweeps
in judicial races based upon the success of a party's high-profile
candidates in presidential, senatorial, or gubernatorial races.26 The
resulting partisan flip-flopping of judges may waste resources, create
instability, and undermine public confidence in the courtsY 7  In
"Republican Party hierarchy" refused to support Newcombe in the general election. See
id.
254. See id. In 1913, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Spruill v.
Bateman, 162 N.C. 486,77 S.E. 768 (1913) (note that this is the case name as it appears in
the North Carolina Reporter; it is entitled Spruill v. Bateman in the South Eastern
Reporter), held that a statute requiring a judgeship to be filled by a licensed attorney was
unconstitutional, determining that the statute added a requirement for office-holding not
authorized in the constitution. See id. at 488-89, 77 S.E. at 769. Since Bateman, judges
without law degrees have held numerous positions on lower courts in North Carolina,
although never serving on the supreme court or court of appeals. See C.E. Hinsdale, in
NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1975, at 67 (Joan G. Brannon ed., 1975) [hereinafter
N.C. LEG. 1975]. Prior to 1974, three efforts to amend the constitution to require that
judges be licensed attorneys had failed in the General Assembly. See id. But after the
1974 primary race, the North Carolina Constitution was amended to require that all
judges be licensed to practice law in North Carolina. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 22 (first
passed by the legislature as Act of May 24, 1979, ch. 638, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 670, and
later approved by voters Nov. 4, 1980). The amendment allowed then-current non-lawyer
judges to retain their positions as long as they continued to be elected. See id.
255. See 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 27.
256. See John J. Korzen, Comment, Changing North Carolina's Method of Judicial
Selection, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 253, 262 (1990). It has not been uncommon for
entire slates of judges to be voted out of office in one election. See Exum, supra note 71,
at 8. Naturally, such a result does not contribute to consistency on the bench and
obviously has a detrimental effect upon those considering whether to serve on the bench.
See id. Other factors that play prominent roles in the decision process are incumbency,
name recognition, inferences about race or gender drawn from the name, and even the
location of the name on the ballot. See id.
257. Cf. Exum, supra note 71, at 8. (noting the ill-effects of partisan sweeps on the
judiciary). The following is a glaring example is North Carolina's 25th Judicial District,
consisting of Burke, Caldwell, and Catawba counties:
In 1966 all Democratic District Court judicial candidates won. In 1970 they
were all defeated by Republicans. In 1974 the Republicans were all defeated by
Democrats; and the District Court bench remained entirely Democratic until
1986 when four of the five candidates running were again defeated by
Republicans....
Needless to say this kind of fruit-basket-turn-over in the judiciary is not
healthy. Yet ... what has happened and is continuing to happen in the 25th
Judicial District could become a statewide reality.
Id. at 8.
Partisan sweeps have also caused trouble on the statewide level. Chief Justice
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addition, the prospect of being voted out of office based upon the
performance of a political party in any given year discourages good
lawyers from leaving the stability of private practices and seeking
spots on the bench2 s Thus, voter ignorance can not only have
detrimental effects on actual judicial elections, but it can lower the
quality of the pool of candidates interested in judgeships.
D. Problems in the Future
The emergence of North Carolina as a two-party state has
transformed the judicial election system, which previously consisted
of what amounted to mock elections for Democratic judges originally
appointed to the bench by the governor.2 9 As Republican power has
continued to grow, and their candidates have begun to win seats on
the bench, judicial races have become fiercely contested and
campaign costs have skyrocketed. This increased competition has
played out in front of a continually uninformed electorate. These
new trends do not bode well for the level of public confidence in
North Carolina's judicial system, as evidenced by the more than
seventy percent of voters who claim dissatisfaction with some aspect
of the court system.26
Two recent reforms to the election system-the lifting of the gag
restriction on judicial candidates standing for election and the switch
to local, nonpartisan elections for superior court judges-purport to
address some of the problems with North Carolina's judicial election
system. 261  In theory, the electorate will have more information
available to them about judicial races, as the candidates will be able
Mitchell, in an address to the General Assembly in 1995, noted that the supreme court
had to cancel court in November and December of 1994 after two justices lost in the
general election, the third time court had been canceled since 1984 due to partisan
sweeps. See Betts, supra note 60, at 323.
258. See 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 27. Supporters tout
nonpartisan elections as a way to avoid partisan sweeps in judicial races because a voter
cannot select judges through straight ticket voting. See Exum, supra note 71, at 8. North
Carolina began using nonpartisan elections in 1998 for superior court judges. See supra
note 334. However, voters will continue to select appellate and district court judges
through partisan elections. See supra note 335. Although nonpartisan elections eliminate
the threat of partisan sweeps in the superior court division, the result is just one less piece
of information available for the voter. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text
(discussing the effect of the new rule on superior court races).
259. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
260. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 8. Specifically, 70% of the voters felt "the courts
were too lenient to criminals, that victims are treated worse then criminals, and that
people with money get preferential treatment." Id.
261. See supra notes 184-286 and accompanying text (discussing the growing political
nature of judges and judicial elections).
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to express their views on current issues. Likewise, the switch to
nonpartisan elections could help combat the growing political nature
of judgeships by reducing the role of partisanship in judicial elections.
Unfortunately, these reforms may not lead to any substantive
change in the judicial selection system, and could even exacerbate the
present situation. In the best case scenario, the lifting of the gag
order provides more information about the stances of specific judicial
candidates. But it could easily add fuel to the fire by allowing judicial
candidates to engage in fierce political and ideological campaigns. 62
With the gag order lifted, and the recent rise of the Republican Party
in North Carolina, even uglier judicial campaigns quickly could
become the rule, not the exception.263  In addition, judicial
candidates' ability to speak out on political issues may offset any
benefits which would have been realized by the nonpartisan election
of superior court judges. Superior court judicial candidates can easily
align themselves with their favored party based upon simple
statements on a few issues in accordance with party platforms. Thus,
the effects of the recent reforms could be cosmetic improvements at
best, and have the potential to actually worsen the current situation.
The real concern with North Carolina's judicial election system
is that the caliber of the bench ultimately will suffer. The quality of
judges on the bench is merely a reflection of the candidates who seek
the position. Whether the quality of the bench suffers because poor
or unscrupulous candidates are being elected by an uninformed or
apathetic electorate, or simply because stronger candidates are
discouraged from seeking positions on the bench, is unimportant. In
either event, the result is bad judges on the bench potentially making
bad law. Until now, North Carolina's one-party de facto appointive
system has managed to provide good judges,261 but it is possible that
this trend will not continue if the problems with the judicial selection
system persist.
262. See Editorial, supra note 251, at A14.
263. See supra notes 206-25 and accompanying text (discussing the lifting of the
announce clause from Canon 7 of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct). Races
could be particularly ugly for appellate and district court judges, who will continue to be
chosen in partisan elections. Since 1994, district court elections historically have been the
most heavily contested races between the two major parties. See GOP Challengers, supra
note 191, at 4. And appellate judges running in statewide elections will continue to be the
highest profile judicial contests. Thus, partisan elections will continue to play a significant
role in selection of judges in North Carolina.
264. See Exum, supra note 71, at 5 (noting that "[w]e have a good judiciary in North
Carolina" because "[w]e are ... still reaping the benefits of a system that, practically, has
been appointed by the Governor with tenure for life or until retirement").
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In an effort to address these growing problems, and to create "a
court system for the 21st century," the Futures Commission proposed
a merit selection plan for choosing all of North Carolina's judges.265
However, the Futures Commission proposal is not the first time such
a plan has been suggested in this state266 Before closely examining
the Commission's merit selection plan, an in-depth examination of
the legislative history of merit selection in North Carolina is
warranted.
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF MERIT SELECTION DEBATE IN
NORTH CAROLINA SINCE 1971
The North Carolina General Assembly has entertained bills
intended to alter the method of judicial selection in almost every
session since 1971.267 North Carolina first began considering a change
to some form of judicial merit selection in 1971 when the North
Carolina Courts Commission recommended replacing the partisan
election of judges with a nonpartisan merit selection plan.3  Over
the next four years, groups in the General Assembly pushed for a
constitutional amendment to adopt the merit selection of judges, but
the efforts met with little success. 269  In 1975, the proposed
amendment's failure was due in part to a lack of support from then-
Lieutenant Governor Jim Hunt.270
Another serious effort to adopt a nonpartisan merit plan was
mounted in 1977,271 this time with the North Carolina Bar
265. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 22. For further discussion on the other reforms
suggested in the Futures Commission proposal, see infra notes 346-51 and accompanying
text.
266. See Betts, supra note 60, at 326-27 (highlighting the "Recent History of the Merit
Selection Debate in the North Carolina General Assembly").
267. See id. (noting, however, that no substantial reform initiative was introduced in
the 1993 session).
268. See 1971 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 11-16. The plan called for a
nominating commission of lawyers, appointed by the chief justice and governor, charged
with recommending two or three names for judicial vacancies. See id. The governor
would select a candidate from that list, with the appointee serving a one to three year trial
period before facing a retention election. See id.
269. In 1974, the bill actually emerged from the legislative committee and passed two
readings on the House floor before failing on the third reading. See N.C. LEG. 1975,
supra note 254, at 66; see also Betts, supra note 60, at 326-27 (listing history of merit
selection debate in North Carolina General Assembly).
270. See Betts, supra note 3, at 16.
271. Attempts in the previous three legislative sessions to adopt a plan similar to the
one first proposed by the Courts Commission in 1971 had met with little success. See C.E.
Hinsdale, in NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1977, at 91 (Joan G. Brannon ed., 1977)
[hereinafter N.C. LEG. 1977].
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Association as the principal sponsor.272 This plan resembled previous
efforts, except that it attempted to address the controversy
surrounding the composition of the nominating committee by
providing for an almost equal number of appointments to the
committee by the chief justice, the governor, and the General
Assembly.2 3 In addition to the bar association, then-Chief Justice
Susie Sharp endorsed the legislation.274 The House bill reached the
floor, but failed by several votes to secure the three-fifths majority
required for passage of a constitutional amendment.275 Opponents of
the bill claimed that merit selection departed from the principles of
Jacksonian democracy276 and also felt that the composition of the
nominating committee was still insufficiently representative.2 77
Governor Jim Hunt waited until after the bill had been defeated to
voice support for the initiative.
278
That same summer, however, political allies informed Governor
Hunt that his tentative selections to fill judicial vacancies could be
potentially embarrassing. 279 The Governor responded by signing an
executive order that created a merit selection plan for filling superior
court judge vacancies that arose mid-term. 80 Governor Hunt used
the plan to fill dozens of superior court judgeships until he left office
in 1985,2'1 although he never extended the process to the court of
272 See id.
273. See id. The previous plans had only provided for the governor and chief justice to
appoint the members of the nominating commission. See id.
274. See Betts, supra note 3, at 16.
275. See N.C. LEG. 1977, supra note 271, at 91.
276. See id.; see also supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text (discussing the impetus
behind the original move to partisan elections).
277. See N.C. LEG. 1977, supra note 271, at 91.
278. See Betts, supra note 3, at 16. Governor Hunt voiced his support for merit
selection as a proposal worth further discussion. See id.
279. See id.; see also Ned Cline, Hunt Was Warned on Judge Selection, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Sept. 1, 1977, at Al (discussing how Governor Hunt could have avoided
embarrassing appointments by creating his own merit nominating process).
280. See Exec. Order No. 12, by James B. Hunt Jr., Governor of North Carolina, (July
28, 1977), amended by Exec. Order No. 24 (May 15, 1978), extended by Exec. Order No.
30 (Dec. 31, 1978). These executive orders were North Carolina's only experiment with
the merit selection of judges. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 24. Critics of the plan
complained that the process was too political and that the nominating panel frequently
omitted clearly qualified candidates, yet included those candidates favored by the
Governor. See id. However, there were several instances in which political allies of
Governor Hunt were not nominated by the merit selection panel. See id. Supporters of
the plan contended that in these situations, the panel performed a valuable service by
allowing the Governor to refrain from appointing political allies. See id.
281. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 24. At that time, North Carolina was actually
listed as a merit selection state for superior court judges by the American Judicature
Society, which considered a state to have a merit selection plan regardless of how the
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appeals or supreme court.m
The push for merit selection slowed during the 1980s until the
fiercely contested race for chief justice between Rhoda Billings and
Jim Exum in 1986.3 This heated race, along with the General
Assembly's 1987 redrawing of the superior court district lines in
response to the Alexander v. Martin84 suit, rekindled the debate over
North Carolina's method of judicial selection. Then-Chief Justice
Exum used the increased focus on the issue to persuade the General
Assembly to create a study commission to examine the issue of
judicial selection."' The General Assembly responded by creating
the Judicial Selection Study Commission ("JSSC").216 The Chief
Justice, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House, and
Attorney General each appointed four of the commission's twenty
members2 The General Assembly charged the Commission to
"study the method of selecting Judges in North Carolina and
recommend any changes needed to improve the system." 8   The
JSSC report, the most recent comprehensive study of North
Carolina's judicial selection methods prior to the Futures
Commission, helped instigate two strong pushes for judicial
appointment, one in 1989 and another in 1991.119
The JSSC recommended that North Carolina adopt a straight
appointive system, with the governor making appointments subject to
the advice and consent of the General Assembly.2 0 Senator Dennis
judge was retained in office once appointed. See Exum, supra note 71, at 5.
282. See Betts, supra note 3, at 16.
283. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text (discussing this heated contest).
284. No. 86-1048-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C., Oct. 2, 1986); see supra notes 151-59 (discussing
Chapter 509).
285. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 32. The North Carolina Courts Commission had
made a similar suggestion in its report to the General Assembly in 1987. See 1987
COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 192, at 4-5 (recommending "that the special
commission be directed to investigate how other states select their judges ... and to
determine the views of the citizens of this state about how their judges should be
selected").
286. See Study Commissions and Committees Act of 1987, ch. 873, § 19A, 1987 N.C.
Sess. Laws 2181, 2216.
287. See id. § 19A.1, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws at 2216.
288. Id. § 19A.2, 1987 Sess. Laws at 2216. The JSSC met and studied the issue of
judicial selection throughout 1988, interviewing numerous representatives from New
Jersey, Maryland, and Texas, who testified concerning how various judicial selection
methods worked in their states. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 32.
289. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 32-36,43-45.
290. See JSSC, supra note 3, at 12. The JSSC plan was shaped by an understanding of
the political reality of the situation. First, the JSSC recognized that any proposal had to
avoid a partisan fight over the makeup of nominating committees, so they eliminated the
need for such a committee. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 33. Second, the Commission
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Winner, a co-chair of the Commission, introduced the proposed
constitutional amendments and statutory authorization into the
Senate in 1989.291 No identical judicial selection bill was introduced
into the House.292 The State Bar association strongly supported the
plan, and many appellate judges also supported the initiative.2 93
However, special interest groups representing trial lawyers, African-
American attorneys, and female attorneys did not.
294
The judicial selection bills met with resistance on two primary
issues: the inclusion of trial judges in the appointment process and
the unlimited discretion given to the governor in the straight
appointment system.295 The General Assembly eventually excluded
trial judges from the legislation, thus providing only for appointment
of supreme court justices and court of appeals judges.296 An
additional compromise required the governor to choose his
appointees from a list submitted by a screening panel, making the
plan more agreeable to lawyers.297 Although the judicial selection
reform passed the Senate with the needed majority by a vote of thirty
to sixteen,298 the exclusion of trial judges caused many of the judges
who had supported the plan to lose interest,299 and the bill was sent to
the House Rules Committee for consideration in 1990 with little
did not seek to eliminate the effects of politics. Rather, the Commission wanted to make
any political aspects of the process visible by openly putting the decision in the hands of
the two bodies most accountable to the people, the governor and the legislature. See
JSSC, supra note 3, at 9-10 (giving the governor the power to make the appointment and
the General Assembly the power to confirm the appointment). No one on the
Commission actively supported a traditional merit selection plan like the one since
proposed by the Futures Commission. See id. at 17 (Minority Report).
291. See S.B. 218, 1989 General Assembly, 1st Sess. (N.C. 1989) (proposing
amendments to the constitution); S.B. 219, 1989 General Assembly, 1st Sess. (N.C. 1989)
(providing implementing statutory changes).
292. Representative H.M. Michaux, the other co-chair of the commission, was an
active member of the African-American Legislative Caucus and had been the primary
sponsor of Chapter 509, which recently had achieved gains for African-Americans among
the ranks of superior court judges. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 34. Representative
Michaux naturally was reluctant to pursue any reform initiatives that threatened the
recent gains. See id. He eventually joined the Commission's minority report, which
argued that no change was needed in North Carolina's judicial selection methods. See
JSSC, supra note 3, at 15-19 (Minority Report); Drennan, supra note 66, at 34.
293. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 36.
294. See id. at 34-35.
295. See id. at 35-36.
296. See id. at 35-36.
297. See id. at 35. Special interest lawyers in particular favored this compromise
because it limited the governor's discretion in making appointments. See id.
298. See 1998 N.C. Senate Journal 458; Betts, supra note 60, at 327.
299. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 36.
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momentum."' Ultimately, the proposal died in the House without
any official discussion in a committee. 0 1
The 1990 judicial elections showed that some of the growing
problems with partisan judicial elections were not going away.32
Therefore, in 1991, the legislature again discussed eliminating judicial
elections, and sponsors introduced similar bills in both the House and
Senate.0 3 Proponents of election reform, fresh off of their failure in
1989, avoided the controversial issue of appointing trial judges and
chose instead to concentrate their effort on the appellate courtsc4
Having omitted trial judges from the proposal, the prospects for
passing the reform looked promising.305
The Senate bill called for the governor to appoint appellate
judges from a list composed of local bar nominees as well as active
and former lower court judges.3 6  After the governor had selected
three to five names from this list, the Judicial Selection and
Nomination Committee would report whether these candidates were
qualified to serve as judges.3 7 The governor would then choose an
appointee from among the approved candidates, and the appointee
would be subject to confirmation by the General Assembly.30 8 This
proposal eventually passed the Senate by a forty-one to six vote.30 9
However, the plan again died in the House in 1992, never even
300. See Betts, supra note 60, at 327; Drennan, supra note 66, at 36.
301. See Betts, supra note 60, at 327.
302. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text (discussing the gutter tactics used
in campaign ads for judicial elections in 1990).
303. See H.B. 102, 1991 N.C. General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1991), S.B. 71, 1991 N.C.
General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1991); Betts, supra note 60, at 326-27.
304. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 43. Resistance from minorities who were not
anxious to jeopardize their recent gains in the superior court and general distrust of
shifting political control from localities to Raleigh necessitated leaving trial judges out of
the proposals. See id.
305. See, e.g., Justice Exum Renews the Call for Merit Selection, N.C. LAW. WKLY,
Mar. 4, 1991, at 1, 1; Merit Selection to be the Prime Lawyer Topic on 1991 Legislative
Agenda: Bar Group May Be Waivering, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 4, 1991, at 1, 1. The
negative campaigning associated with the 1990 elections helped to soften the Academy of
Trial Lawyers' official position on the issue of judicial selection reform. See Drennan,
supra note 66, at 43. This change in position was especially significant, as the Academy of
Trial Lawyers had been an ardent supporter of judicial elections for some time. See id.
Both the African-American and women's lawyer groups supported change, but not the
specific reforms represented by the Senate bill. See id.
306. See S.B. 71, 1991 N.C. General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1991).
307. See id.
308. See id. The Senate Bill also gave the General Assembly the power to decide how
to retain judges and justices for subsequent eight-year terms after the initial four-year
term. See id.
309. See 1991 N.C. SENATE JOURNAL 142.
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making it out of committee.31°  A number of circumstances
contributed to this failure. First, Democrats generally were happy
with the election results in 1990.311 Second, the advent of contested
elections among the judiciary forced the Democratic appellate judges
to become more visible and active within the party. 12 Although
many judges viewed this activity negatively, some legislators felt that
the party benefited from the added presence of the judges on the
campaign trail.313 Third, a major obstacle for the legislation in the
House was the inability of interested parties to agree on the
appropriate means for selecting the judicial candidates.34  The
Governor did not want to be limited by a set list of potential
candidates, preferring complete discretion.3 5 On the other hand,
lawyers' groups, other than the bar association, wanted the
Commission to select the three to five names in order to limit the
governor's discretion.316 Ultimately, the ability or inability to trust
the governor to make good appointments became a point of
contention which proved fatal to the entire reform effort.
Although the General Assembly did not consider the judicial
selection issue during the 1993 legislative session,31 8 events in 1994
310. See Betts, supra note 60, at 327. The approved Senate version of the plan, S.B.
71, made its way to the House Committee on Courts, Justice, Constitutional
Amendments, and Referenda for consideration in 1992, but did not make it out of the
committee. See id. at 327.
311. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 41. Then-Chief Justice James Exum, a Democrat,
and two other Democratic supreme court justices ran in contested elections and were
victorious. See Abstract of Votes Cast for Justice of Supreme Court in the General
Election Held on November 6, 1990. Seven court of appeals judges also stood for re-
election, six Democrats and one Republican, and the Democrats won all seven races. See
Abstract of Votes Cast for Court of Appeals Judges in General Election Held on
November 6, 1990. The Democrats also took seven contested superior court judgeships.
See Abstract of Votes Cast for Superior Court Judges in General Election Held on
November 6, 1990. These judicial successes were a highlight for the Democratic Party,
especially considering the Republicans handily won the U.S. Senate race between Jesse
Helms and Harvey Gantt. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 41.
312. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 44.
313. See id. These legislators viewed active campaigning by judges not only as a
benefit to the party as a whole, by displaying Democratic strength on the bench, but also
as "a helpful antidote to judicial arrogance and ivory towerism." Id.
314. See id.
315. See id. The Governor argued that complete discretion would allow him to attract
and recruit better candidates. See id.
316. See id. This selection method resembles the initial selection method favored by
the Futures Commission merit selection plan, although without the legislative approval.
See infra notes 346-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Futures Commission merit
selection plan).
317. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 45.
318. See Betts, supra note 60, at 327.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
quickly returned the issue to the forefront. Chief Justice Exum
created the Futures Commission, which began its two-year study of
North Carolina's judicial system.119 The federal district court decision
declaring North Carolina's statewide election of superior court judges
unconstitutional also occurred in 1994.320 Additionally, the elections
of 1994 saw record campaign expenditures by candidates for
judgeships, with Republicans faring very well in statewide judicial
races.321 And in late 1994 in Raleigh, just prior to the 1995 legislative
session, the state's trial and appellate judges held their first-ever
conference .3 2 At this conference, North Carolina's judges adopted a
nearly unanimous resolution recommending judicial appointment.23
Finally, in an address to the 1995 General Assembly, Chief Justice
Burley Mitchell endorsed reform of the judicial selection process.3 24
Feeling the pressure mount to reform the judicial selection
process, the Senate in 1995 again tried to implement a judicial
appointment bill.3 5 The plan called for gubernatorial nomination of
appellate judges,326 legislative confirmation of the nominees, and
319. See WFDD, supra note 4, at iii.
320. See Republican Party v. Hunt, 841 F. Supp. 722, 732 (E.D.N.C. 1994), aff'd as
modified sub nom. Republican Party of N.C. v. North Carolina State Bd. Of Elections, 27
F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 1994), remanded Republican Party v. Hunt, 77 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 1996);
supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text. Several measures aimed at codifying the
federal court's decision-that superior court judges be elected in their home districts-
failed during the 1995 session. See Joan G. Brannon & Thomas H. Thornburg, in NORTH
CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1995, at 7-5 (Joseph S. Ferrell ed., 1995) [hereinafter N.C. LEG.
1995].
321. See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text (discussing the record 1994
campaign expenditures).
322 See N.C. LEG. 1995, supra note 320, at 7-5.
323. See id.
324. See Betts, supra note 60, at 323. To support his endorsement, Chief Justice
Mitchell pointed to: (1) the expense and time involved in running for judgeships in
strongly contested partisan races; (2) the supreme court's cancellation of court in
November and December due to election losses by two justices, the third such
cancellation in ten years; and (3) the 1994 resolution by North Carolina judges endorsing
an appointive system for judges. See id.
325. See S.B. 971, 1995 N.C. General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995). Six different bills
were actually introduced in the 1995 session which would have changed judicial selection
in North Carolina. Proposals varied from nonpartisan elections to gubernatorial
appointments with legislative confirmation. Senate Bill 971 emerged as the primary
vehicle for judicial selection reform. See N.C. LEG. 1995, supra note 320, at 7-5.
326. Senate Bill 971, as introduced, included trial judges in the appointment process.
However, the final version that was sent to the House dealt only with appellate judges
and justices. See N.C. LEG. 1995, supra note 320, at 7-5. Apparently, this move indicated
that the Republicans had faith in their growing electoral power and wished to try and gain
more superior and district court judgeships at the polls. See id. For their part, the
Democrats were not yet ready to concede their domination of the judicial ranks at the
polls, feeling that the recent Republican successes were flukes. See id.
2306 [Vol. 76
1998] MERIT SELECTION OFJUDGES 2307
periodic retention elections.327 Senate Bill 971 passed the Senate with
bipartisan support.31 Although merit selection received the support
of a majority of support in the House, it failed to get the required
number of votes for a constitutional amendment.32 9  Despite
continued pleas from the state's appellate judges and a last-minute
appearance by Governor Hunt on behalf of the measure,330 the effort
at judicial reform ultimately failed due to a lack of Democratic
support.3 '
Soon after this defeat, however, judicial reform garnered a
victory. In 1996, during the last days of the short legislative session,
the General Assembly passed legislation ("Chapter 9") which
required superior court judges to stand for election in their home
districts starting in 1996.332 The superior court elections would
remain partisan for the 1996 elections.333 Then, beginning with the
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See John L. Sanders, in N.C. LEG. 1995, supra note 320, at 6-5. The number
needed to put a constitutional amendment on the ballot before the public is both 30 (out
of 50) in the Senate and 70 (out of 120) in the House. See N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 4
(requiring a three-fifths approval in each house). The Senate version of the bill did not
reach this three-fifths threshold in the House, failing on the second reading with 62 votes
for and 43 votes against. See Sanders, supra, at 6-5.
330. See N.C. LEG. 1995, supra note 320, at 7-5.
331. See Betts, supra note 60, at 327. One key factor in the failure of this judicial
appointment amendment was the House's failure to confirm Governor Hunt's
appointment of the wife of a former Democratic state senator to a seat on the State Board
of Education. See N.C. LEG. 1995, supra note 320, at 7-5. House Republicans voted as a
block and defeated the nomination. See id. Opponents of merit selection within the
Democratic Party pointed to the vote as an example of the role partisan politics would
play if judicial candidates had to be confirmed by the General Assembly. See id. Other
reasons for voting the bill down included concerns that an appointive system would
"[take] votes away from the people" and create a system that "would act like a close
cousin to the federal system, where judges are appointed for life." Judicial Bill May Get
Benched, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 26, 1995, at A3. Chief Justice
Mitchell responded to the defeat by stating that "[i]t will be well into the next century
before we get an opportunity to get hard partisan politics out of the judiciary." Id.
332. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536. This
legislation, in effect, codified the federal district court's decision of litigation initiated by
the Republican Party that sought to force the state to hold local elections for superior
court judges. See N.C. LEG. 1996, supra note 2, at 3-3; see supra notes 166-80 and
accompanying text (discussing the federal district court decision in Republican Party v.
North Carolina and the Fourth Circuit reversal). Because the Fourth Circuit's reversal of
that decision left the question of how superior court judges would be elected unsettled,
and the outcomes of the 1994 elections in question, the General Assembly acted to
resolve the uncertainty by declaring that all superior court judges would henceforth be
elected by district. See N.C. LEG. 1996, supra note 2, at 3-3. The bill also ratified the
results of the 1994 election, which used local districts as the electoral unit, because two
incumbents had won in their districts but had lost in the statewide voting. See id.
333. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, §§ 1-6, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536,
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1998 general election, all superior court judges would be elected
using a nonpartisan primary election.3  Appellate and district court
judges would continue to be selected through partisan elections.335
This legislation was the first fundamental change in the way North
Carolina had selected its superior court judges for over 125 years.336
536-41; N.C. LEG. 1996, supra note 2, at 3-3. Chapter 9 also made changes in the term
length for persons appointed to fill vacancies in certain superior court districts. See id. at
3-3. In the past, the term of office had attached to "the position, not the person," for
superior court and appellate judgeships. Id. Thus, if a person was appointed to fill a
vacant superior court judgeship, she would only stand for election to serve the remainder
of her predecessor's term, not a full eight-year term. See id. The General Assembly
changed this rule for appellate judges in 1995, such that the eight-year term attached to
the person, not the office. See id. Chapter 9 made this rule applicable to superior court
judges as well, but only in districts with only one judge and districts not covered by
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, § 21(b), 1996
N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536, 554-55; N.C. LEG. 1996, supra note 2, at 3-3; see also
supra note 129 (noting that 60 of North Carolina's 100 counties are not covered by
Section 5). Thus, in multi-member districts covered by Section 5, no change in terms of
office occurred. See N.C. LEG. 1996, supra note 2, at 3-3. Although the distinction
resulted in judges being treated differently based simply on where they lived, over time
the new rule would result in staggered terms in multi-member districts. See id. The
Justice Department had determined that staggered terms violated the Voting Rights Act
because they made it impossible for minorities to engage in single-shot voting. See id.
The North Carolina General Assembly had eliminated all staggered terms for superior
court judges in 1987 in response to litigation under § 5. See Act of June 29, 1987, ch. 509,
1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 769; see also supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text (discussing
the General Assembly's response to Voting Rights litigation). Therefore, because the
General Assembly did not wish to seek preclearance in order to implement the voting
change, it simply excluded any counties which would require preclearance. See N.C. LEG.
1996, supra note 2, at 3-3.
334. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, §§ 7-20, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536,
541-54. A nonpartisan primary election is similar to the method used in many municipal
elections. See N.C. LEG. 1996, supra note 2, at 3-3. The legislation calls for the holding of
a primary, if necessary, to narrow down the field of candidates to two for each open seat
in the district. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, §§ 7-20, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess.
536, 551-54. The remaining candidates would then meet in the general election, with the
winners determined by a plurality of the votes-meaning candidates would not run versus
a specific opponent; whoever gets the most votes wins. See id. For example, four
candidates run for two open seats. The two highest vote-getters win.
335. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, § 22, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 536, 555.
An interesting question is why the General Assembly suddenly decided to take this step.
Switching to the local election of superior court judges was not surprising, considering the
uncertainty surrounding superior court elections and the still-pending litigation on the
issue. See supra note 332 and accompanying text. However, adopting nonpartisan
elections for superior court judges was true judicial reform, even if it fell short of adopting
a merit selection plan.
336. See N.C. LEG. 1996, supra note 2, at 3-2.
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V. SUGGESTION OF THE FUTURES COMMISSION-MERIT
SELECTION
A. "Without Favor, Denial or Delay: A Court System for the 21st
Century"
3 37
Two years prior to the General Assembly's first successful
efforts at judicial reform,33 8 then-Chief Justice Exum had created the
Commission for the Future of Justice and the Courts ("Futures
Commission") and charged it with identifying the weaknesses of the
North Carolina judicial system and finding solutions.3 39 The Futures
Commission was an independent body consisting of a diverse group
of twenty-seven members representing lawyers, business people,
newspaper publishing, social services, law enforcement, academia,
and the legislature.34 ° The entire commission met at least once a
month for two years and held hearings across the state in an attempt
to understand the problems facing North Carolina's judicial branch.31
Based upon this broad inquiry into the health of North
Carolina's judicial system, the Futures Commission concluded that
the system's deficiencies could not be fixed by mere adjustments.
Instead, the entire system needed to be redesigned."42 To this end,
the Futures Commission made eleven core recommendations for
changing the current judicial system in North Carolina 43 Although
337. WFDD, supra note 4 (quoting title of the report).
338. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text (discussing judicial reform bill of
1996).
339. See WFDD, supra note 4, at iii. Chief Justice Exum stepped down at the end of
1994, and his successor, Chief Justice Burley Mitchell, continued to support the Futures
Commission. See Michael Crowell, "Without Favor, Denial, or Delay". The
Recommendations of the Commission for the Future of Justice and the Courts in North
Carolina, POPULAR GOV'T, Spring 1997, at 19,20.
340. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 10. The Futures Commission members served
without pay. See id. Staff and administrative expenses were funded by the Governor's
Crime Commission and the private Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation. See id.
341. See Crowell, supra note 339, at 21. The Futures Commission sought broad input
by holding six public hearings in various cities across the state, conducting ten focus
groups and organizing an 805-person telephone survey. See id. Questionnaires were sent
to all North Carolina judges and numerous parties appeared before the Futures
Commission, including representatives from other states who talked about similar
projects in their states. See id.
342. See WFDD, supra note 4, at iii.
343. See id. at 17. In addition to the appointment of judges, the Futures Commission
plan recommends: (1) allowing courts to have self-control over organization and resource
allocation; (2) establishing a single trial court level (called the Circuit court); (3) reducing
the number of judicial districts from 40 to between 12 and 18; (4) establishing a family
court in each district; (5) creating a State Judicial Council; (6) providing court
administrators in each district; (7) shifting prosecutors and public defenders from the
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many of the recommendations focused on concerns of administrative
and economic efficiency, the main thrust of the Futures
Commission's proposal dealt with granting the judiciary the
independence befitting a separate and equal branch of government. 44
According to the Commission, the need to free judges from the
negative consequences of elections is essential to the goal of an
independent judiciary.345
The Futures Commission plan for judicial selection calls for the
elimination of contested elections for all judges, both appellate and
trial level.M6 The governor would fill judicial vacancies by making an
appointment from a list of three qualified candidates nominated by a
neutral panel.' 47 The new judge would stand for a retention election
at the first general election that is more than one year after her
appointment.' If retained, each judge would serve an eight-year
term, facing another retention election at the end of each term3M9
Prior to a retention election, a neutral committee would evaluate the
judge's performance; this information would aid the electorate in
making an informed decision in the election .3  Thus, the Futures
Commission plan resembles a traditional merit selection plan
followed by a retention election.351 This Comment will now consider
the arguments for and against merit selection based upon how the
system has performed in addressing many of the problems North
Carolina faces today.
B. Arguments for Merit Selection
Advocates of merit selection point to four general benefits in
support of the system: (1) those persons selecting the judges are able
judicial to the executive branch; (8) increasing emphasis on alternative dispute resolution;
(9) developing a long-range technology plan; and (10) improving public education about
the courts. See id.
344. See id. at 12.
345. See id. (noting that every group that has studied North Carolina's courts in the
last thirty years has reached the same conclusion).
346. See id. at 32.
347. See id. For further discussion of neutral nominating commissions, see infra notes
419-29 and accompanying text.
348. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 32. For further discussion of retention elections, see
infra notes 430-50 and accompanying text.
349. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 32.
350. See id. For further discussion on performance evaluations, see infra notes 451-58
and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing basic merit selection
system).
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to make more informed choices than voters could;352 (2) the judicial
selection process is depoliticized;353 (3) better and more qualified
judges are ultimately selected;354 and (4),the judiciary becomes more
independent.3 5   As discussed previously, the voting public is
generally uninformed when making a decision between judicial
candidates,356 and partisan elections have not proved successful in
informing North Carolina's electorate of judicial candidates'
qualifications for office.35 7 Merit selection systems, however, do not
rely upon an uninformed electorate to make the choice between
various judicial candidates. 8  Rather, a judicial nominating
committee makes this choice.35 9  The nominating committee can
make a better selection than voters because it has more information
about the candidates, as well as a better understanding of the
qualifications necessary to make a good judge.360 Thus, the
committee can select those candidates who are most qualified in
terms of training, experience, ability, temperament, and character.361
Conversely, the committee will screen out candidates who are unfit
or merely mediocre. 62
Although no system of judicial selection eliminates political
considerations completely,363 a merit selection system minimizes the
effects of partisan politics on the judicial selection process and allows
judges to concentrate on the business of the courts.3 64 Merit selection
eliminates bitter election contests, inappropriate fundraising by
judges, and the need to take a stand on political issues that may come
before the court as litigation. Politicized judicial campaigns
352. See infra notes 356-62 and accompanying text.
353. See infra notes 363-66 and accompanying text.
354. See infra notes 367-74 and accompanying text.
355. See infra notes 375-79 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 249-58 and accompanying text.
357. See Helms, supra note 189, at 24.
358. See STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 35, at 41.
359. See id.
360. Cf. 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 27 (arguing that the voting
public is uninformed).
361. See Helms, supra note 189, at 25.
362. See id. at 30. Likewise, candidates are unable to merely capitalize on their party
affiliations to reach the bench. See 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 30.
363. See id. at 26 (arguing that "[t]he problem with North Carolina's system is that it
does not encourage other non-political considerations").
364. See Barry F. McNeil, State Judges: Merit Selection, Not Partisan Politics,
LITIGATION, Summer 1996, at 1, 64 (noting former Texas Supreme Court Justice John
Hill's concern that elections make judicial candidates overly partisan and unable to
uphold an oath of impartiality).
365. See 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 26.
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demean both the office and the candidate, merit system proponents
argue, and should no longer be tolerated. 66
A merit selection plan also attracts more qualified candidates,
many of whom would not seek a position on the bench if exposed to a
partisan election process. 67 Indeed, one of the most frequently cited
reasons among highly qualified lawyers in refusing to seek positions
on the bench is partisan politics. 368 Ordinarily, the threat of losing an
election is daunting, but it is particularly unappealing where the loss
could result from an uninformed electorate or a bad candidate at the
top of the party ticket.369 A merit selection plan eliminates these
concerns, making the bench more attractive to a larger pool of
candidates. 370  By attracting better candidates through a merit
selection process, the quality of the judges on the bench improves.371
Implementing a merit selection plan for judges also promotes
the advancement of groups historically disadvantaged under an
elective system, such as African-Americans and women. 72
Presumably, nominating committees are more mindful of the need to
include minorities and women on the bench and therefore may be
more likely to select them than the voting public in an election.373 An
366. See id. at 27.
367. Cf. Edmund V. Ludwig, Another Case Against the Election of Trial Judges, PA.
LAW., May-June 1997, at 33, 36 ("The independence of the federal judge, which includes,
most importantly, never having to stand for election, is a powerful incentive to attract
well-qualified candidates to the bench.").
368. See 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 26.
369. See id. Such a notion is even more unappealing if the ousted judge is forced to
rebuild a private practice after years on the bench. See id.
370. A 1987 study by the American Judicature Society showed that less than 1.2% of
judges lost retention elections. See William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years
of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 347 (1987) (noting
that only 22 incumbent judges were defeated in 1864 judicial elections analyzed in 10
states over 20 years).
371. The screening function of merit selection systems also helps improve the quality
of the bench, by keeping unqualified or unscrupulous candidates off the bench. See
Ludwig, supra note 367, at 37. Judge Edmund V. Ludwig (E.D. Pa.), who previously
served as an elected state trial judge, argues that "the appointment process at least
exposes the candidate to a great deal of scrutiny." Id. at 37; see also id. at 36 (discussing
the thorough scrutiny one receives before appointment to a federal bench).
372. See John Engler & Lucille Taylor,Judicial Selection: A View from the Governor's
Perspective, 75 MICH. B.J. 910, 912 (1996). Michigan Governor John Engler notes that he
is "especially proud of the women and African-Americans I have appointed, many to
courts or in communities where neither had served either by election or appointment."
Id. But see supra note 158 (discussing statistics indicating that North Carolina's judiciary
is no longer a bastion of white males).
373. See 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 30. Merit selection plans in
other states have enhanced the prospects for women and minorities seeking positions on
the bench. See Alexander Stille, Election v. Appointment: Who Wins?, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
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increased minority and female presence among judges improves the
quality of the bench by helping to maintain the confidence and
respect of the public at large.374
Finally, merit selection systems help produce a more
independent judiciary, free from election concerns and the need to
curry favor within a political party.375 The costs of campaigning in
terms of time, money, and personnel are simply too high,
unnecessary, and ethically suspect.376 Merit selection supporters
"question how it is possible for judges to remain objective and
impartial in settling disputes when they know that past campaign
support or future campaign challenges oblige them to decide in a
particular self-protective way. ' 377 Free from campaigning, judges can
focus on the business of the courts and on deciding their cases in a
fair and impartial manner.378 Furthermore, voters can direct their
attention to the judge's record, instead of her political affiliation or
stance on political issues.379
C. Arguments Against Merit Selection
Critics of merit selection point to the ambiguity of the word
"merit" when applied to qualifications for judges, which implies that
judicial candidates can be compared and contrasted based purely on
30, 1985-Jan. 6, 1986, at 1, 4 (pointing to a 1985 study by the Fund for Modem Courts in
New York finding that women and minorities are far more likely to reach the bench in
states that appoint rather than elect judges); see also Robert C. Luskin et al., How
Minority Judges Fare in Retention Elections, 77 JUDICATURE 316, 319-20 (1994)
(presenting the results of a study of nearly every judicial retention election between 1980
and 1990, which showed almost no correlation between whether a judge was African-
American or Hispanic and the percentage of affirmative votes).
374. See Helms, supra note 189, at 25.
375. See 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 30.
376. See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The Continuing Case for Merit Selection of Judges in
Arkansas, ARK. LAW., Spring 1996, at 1, 39. Averill, in fact, argues that the process of
electing judges attracts "[c]andidates having undistinguished careers and even ethical
committee reprimands ... because of the electorate's interest in nonqualification
criteria." Id.
377. Nicholas P. Lovrich et al., Citizen Knowledge and Voting in Judicial Elections, 73
JUDICATURE 28,28 (1989). U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, in a speech to
the American Bar Association, compared the election of judges to "'allowing football
fans to elect their referees.'" Ludwig, supra note 367, at 34 (quoting speech by Justice
Stevens). One commentator suggested that judicial elections make fair and impartial
adjudication so difficult as to violate the constitutional requirement of procedural due
process. See Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and
Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 187, 188-89 (1996).
378. See 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 30.
379. See id.
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objective criteria.80 Indeed, even professional competence is not a
totally objective concept. Reasonable people can easily disagree over
how to evaluate past academic performance, not to mention later
success in legal practice.381  And these supposedly objective
determinations do not even include the more subjective evaluations
about temperament and character that merit selection supporters
purport to consider in their decisions.
More specifically, critics of merit selection dispute the theory
that the electorate has too little information to make an informed
choice.m They view voters, in the aggregate, as intelligent enough to
make meaningful choices in judicial elections. 84 In fact, some studies
show that although the average voter may not be well-informed,
voters who are sufficiently knowledgeable about judicial candidates
are far more likely to cast votes in those contests than their
unknowledgeable counterparts. 385  As the amount of information
about judicial elections increases, difficulties associated with an
uninformed electorate should decline. Past problems with voter
apathy in North Carolina's judicial elections can be viewed as by-
products of the numerous uncontested races that resulted from the
Democratic party's dominance throughout the state. 6  Now that
North Carolina has emerged as a two-party state, more judicial
candidates can expect to run in contested elections.38 Further, with
the lifting of the gag rule,88 judges may now announce where they
stand on issues of public importance and defend their positions in the
face of attacks from unscrupulous opponents.38 9 As a result of these
changes, the voting public should have more information about
judicial candidates, allowing the electorate to make informed choices.
380. See Editorial, Judicial Selection-Keeping the Process Open, 75 JUDICATURE 236,
236 (1992) [hereinafter Keeping the Process Open].
381. See id.
382. See id.
383. See Lovrich, supra note 377, at 28, 30.
384. See id.
385. See id.
386. See Rosch & Rubin, supra note 3, at 33.
387. See Moog, supra note 194, at 70.
388. See supra notes 206-25 and accompanying text (discussing lifting of the gag rule).
389. Cf. Dayton, supra note 197, at 1 (discussing how judicial candidates may now air
their views on disputed legal or political issues). Justice Exum found himself in such a
position in his 1986 race for supreme court chief justice against Rhoda Billings. The
Committee for a Conservative Court repeatedly and misleadingly attacked Justice
Exum's stance on the death penalty. See Betts, supra note 3, at 20. However, under
Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Justice Exum was unable to respond and speak
publicly about his position on the issue. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 28; supra notes
193-98 and accompanying text (discussing the 1986 supreme court election).
[Vol. 762314
MERIT SELECTION OF JUDGES
Critics of merit selection also contend that politics will always be
a part of judicial selection. 90 A move to judicial appointment merely
shifts the political nature of judicial selection from open elections to
secret nominating committees. 91 Judges are still selected based on
their political alliances with those in power; they merely have to
campaign among a select few. 92 Further, an appointment plan does
not necessarily eliminate bitter campaign battles because fierce
contests can still develop when controversial judges come up for
retention elections, 39 3 as happened in the California Supreme Court
retention elections in 1986.394
Opponents of merit selection also urge that this system is
unnecessary in North Carolina because the state already has very
capable judges serving in its courts, all of whom were chosen through
the current election system.395  There have been only isolated
instances of judicial scandal and few complaints of judicial
incompetence.3 96 Further, despite arguments to the contrary, there is
no evidence that merit selection plans have actually improved the
quality of the judges in the states that have adopted such plans? 97
Finally, in the quest to create a more independent judiciary,
appointive systems take the power to choose judges out of the hands
of the people. 98 Instead, the choice of judges depends upon a
nominating process vested in the hands of a small, elite, and perhaps
secretive group.399 Some states have even faced controversy due to
390. See Keeping the Process Open, supra note 380, at 236 ("[Cjompeting interests will
inevitably seek a say in governmental decisions, and it is better to let them compete for
attention than to suppress them.").
391. See Betts, supra note 3, at 27 (listing arguments for and against merit selection).
392- See id.
393. See id.
394. See infra notes 445-47 and accompanying text (discussing the heated 1986
California retention race which resulted in the removal of three justices because of their
"liberal" views toward the death penalty). North Carolina has already had some
unpleasant experiences with special interest groups getting involved in judicial campaigns.
See supra notes 193-202 and accompanying text. It is possible that under an appointment
system with retention elections, such special interest campaigns could become more
prevalent in North Carolina. See Rosch & Rubin, supra note 3, at 29.
395. See JSSC, supra note 3, at 15 (minority report). But see Betts, supra note 60, at
322 (noting that 52% of North Carolina judges sitting in 1985 were appointed to their
current term in office, and that many more first reached the bench through appointment).
396. See Rosch & Rubin, supra note 3, at 29.
397. See id. at 30 (pointing to the experiences of a dozen states over the last 45 years,
which arguably shows no evidence that judges chosen through merit selection are any
better than those chosen through partisan elections).
398. See Betts, supra note 60, at 324 (noting that this sentiment has played a role in the
defeat of past judicial reform efforts in North Carolina).
399. See Rosch & Rubin, supra note 3, at 29. Critics of merit selection in North
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scandals in the selection of judicial candidates through merit
selection, including Missouri, the first state to adopt such a plan.400 In
contrast, elections are open to the public and thus embody our
republican tradition.4 1 They provide a means to educate the public
about candidates and produce judges who can be held accountable.4 °z
Additionally, elections increase judges' stature and credibility.4 3
VI. COMPARING THE FUTURES COMMISSION PROPOSAL TO PAST
EFFORTS AT JUDICIAL REFORM
The judicial selection plan of the Futures Commission differs
from previous legislative attempts to reform the judiciary in both its
scope and approach.40 Further, the Futures Commission's merit
selection proposal seeks to overcome some of the obstacles that
perhaps defeated judicial reform in the past, while still addressing the
problems of the election system that raised the need for court reform
in the first place. Therefore, a look at each facet of the Futures
Commission's judicial selection proposal is warranted and gives
insight into its ultimate potential for success.
Carolina have suggested that such a system would give too much power over who
becomes a judge to bar associations. See id. In particular, the North Carolina Academy
of Trial Lawyers voiced this concern, worried that bar associations, which are
traditionally dominated by corporate attorneys, would be able to control the selection
process. See id.
400. See id. A Missouri Supreme Court justice accused the Chief Justice of attempting
to "pack" the court by influencing the nominating committee. See Paul Wenske,
Dissension Rocks Missouri Justices, NAT'L L.J., May 27, 1985, at 1, 26. The scandal
undermined public confidence in Missouri's judicial selection system, as well as the courts
as a whole. See id.
401. See Averill, supra note 376, at 39.
402. See id.
403. See id.
404. The Futures Commission plan attempts to include trial judges in the merit
selection system. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 22. Reform plans in 1989, 1991, and 1995
only addressed appellate judgeships in the end. See supra notes 290-96, 303-17, 325-31,
and accompanying text. In addition, the appointment of judges is merely one of
numerous improvements the Futures Commission envisions for North Carolina's court
system, see WFDD, supra note 4, at 69, which may draw some of the attention away from
the judicial selection component. Other specific recommendations that also would
require constitutional amendments include: (1) establishing a State Judicial Council; (2)
granting the supreme court authority to set the rules of trial procedure; (3) merging
superior and district courts; (4) granting the court system control over its budget; (5)
allowing juries of six members; (6) eliminating the constitutional right to trial by jury for
petty misdemeanors; and (7) transferring prosecutors and public defenders to the
executive branch. See id.
405. Comparisons with the 1989, 1991, and 1995 proposals are most informative. The
switch to nonpartisan elections for superior court judges in 1996, while technically judicial
reform, was more of a reactive measure in the face of continued lawsuits and legal
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A. Appointment by the Governor
The judicial reform proposals of 1989, 1991, and 1995 all
provided for the gubernatorial selection of a candidate followed by
some kind of legislative confirmation.4 6 This suggestion met with
stiff resistance for a number of reasons. First, there was a dispute
over the extent of the governor's discretion in choosing the
candidates.0 7 One fear was that the governor would resort to
political cronyism in making appointments. 408  A neutral screening
panel to evaluate the list of candidates chosen by the governor and
make a non-binding report about the candidates' qualifications was
suggested as a compromise in 1989.419 In 1991, the reform proposal
required the governor to select candidates from a list provided to him
by law, thus restricting gubernatorial discretion even more.410
However, under both the 1989 or 1991 proposals, the list of potential
candidates from which the governor could choose remained fairly
broad.41 Thus, neither of these concessions convinced special
interest groups that the gubernatorial discretion would be restricted
in any substantial way.412
Another problem with the previously proposed systems of
appointment was the requirement of legislative confirmation. Many
observers believed politics would always intercede in those legislative
approval deliberations, creating a system that would too closely
resemble the federal system of judicial selection.413 A bitter
confirmation fight in the House in 1995 over a gubernatorial
appointment to the State Board of Education merely reinforced this
view among legislators.414
The Futures Commission proposal avoids both of these problems
by bypassing legislative confirmations and allowing judicial
nominating committees to compile the lists of candidates.415 Aside
uncertainty. See supra note 332.
406. See S.B. 971, 1995 N.C. General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1989); S.B. 71, 1991 N.C.
General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1991); S.B. 218, 1989 General Assembly, 1st Sess. (N.C.
1989).
407. See supra notes 295,314-17 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 316-317 and accompanying text.
409. See S.B. 219, 1989 General Assembly, 1st Sess. (N.C. 1989).
410. See S.B. 71,1991 N.C. General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1991).
411. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 36, 44.
412. See id. at 45.
413. See Betts, supra note 60, at 324-25 (citing Judicial Bill May Get Benched, supra
note 331, at A3).
414. See N.C. LEG. 1995, supra note 320, at 7-5.
415. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 32.
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from input into the composition of the nominating committee, the
General Assembly ultimately does not have any say in who becomes
a judge.4 6 Thus, there would be no bitter political fighting over
judicial candidates. Although the proposal grants the governor the
power to appoint a candidate to the bench, it restricts the governor's
discretion by requiring that the choice come from a list of three
candidates compiled by the nominating commission.417 Thus, there
would be no overt political cronyism by the governor in making the
appointments.418
B. Nominating Commissions
The nominating commission is "the heart" of any merit selection
plan.41 9 Its purpose is "to minimize the political patronage in judicial
appointments and maximize the quality of those appointments. '420
Much concern had arisen in 1989 about the composition of any
nominating committee which would compile a list of candidates.42 ,
This concern was sufficient to warrant abandoning the nominating
committee plan in favor of allowing the governor to select the
candidates, subject to a screening panel.422 The similar 1991 judicial
reform legislation also avoided a nominating committee in favor of a
screening panel.4n3 In both cases, disputes arose over the extent of
the governor's discretion in making appointments, with some concern
that the governor would award judgeships on the basis of loyalty and
political alliances. 424
416. See id. at 32, 34. However, the president pro tempore of the Senate and the
speaker of the House would each get to appoint three members of the proposed State
Judicial Council. See id. at 34.
417. See id.
418. In some respect, the governor may actually benefit from a reduced role in the
selection of judicial appointees because she is relieved of the occasional embarrassment
of having to choose political favorites, some of whom may be less than well-qualified.
Yet, the governor can still take credit for any outstanding appointments she makes from
the list supplied by the nominating commission. See 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra
note 111, at 30.
419. See id. at 29.
420. Deja, supra note 43, at 907.
421. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 36. Many legislators figured that the governor
simply would appoint his cronies to any such committee, and that they generally would
nominate the candidates that the governor wanted. Thus, the neutral nominating
committee would result in the governor essentially having the power to "choose" the
candidates he wanted. Cf id. (discussing the sentiment that prevailed during both the
1989 and 1991 reform efforts).
422. See id.
423. See id.
424. See id. at 36, 44-45.
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The Futures Commission attempted to avoid political bickering
over the composition and power of the nominating committee by
recommending the creation of the State Judicial Council.425 In
addition to nominating judicial candidates, this council would serve a
variety of other functions.426 The Futures Commission envisioned an
"important, influential body [whose] prestige rank[s] with the
university system's board of governors."'427 The eighteen members of
the State Judicial Council would be selected based on input from the
governor, the chief justice, the Senate, the House, the state bar, and
local circuits.428 The chief justice would chair the council, which
would include both lawyers and non-lawyers.429 Presumably, a
powerful, visible, and accountable body like the proposed council
would not be very susceptible to the influence of any one branch and
would approach the nomination of judicial candidates as one of its
many responsibilities involving the management of the judicial
branch.
C. Retention Elections
One major argument against an appointment system for judges is
that the system takes away the public's voting power and clashes with
425. The role of the State Judicial Council would be to serve as a "sounding and
advisory board for managing the courts." WFDD, supra note 4, at 34.
426. For example, the council would establish performance standards for the courts,
periodically evaluate the operation of the courts, advise the chief justice on budget
matters, alter district lines when necessary, and review suggested changes to rules of
procedure. See id. at 35.
427. Id.
428. See id. at 34. Thus, the Futures Commission proposal would allow for a broader
range of input concerning the makeup of the nominating committee than the prior plans.
The committee would consist of eighteen members: (1) the chief justice; (2) the chief
judge of the court of appeals; (3) a local prosecutor chosen by them from among their
ranks; (4) a public defender chosen by that group; (5) a trial judge chosen by that group;
(6-7) two lawyers appointed by the State Bar; (8-9) one lawyer and one non-lawyer
appointed by the chief justice; and (9-18) three members (two non-lawyers and one
lawyer) appointed by each of the governor, the president pro tempore of the Senate, and
the Speaker of the House. See id. Members of the State Judicial Council would serve
staggered, four year terms. See id. Note that no legislator could be appointed to the
council. See id.
429. See id. The council would include judges, lawyers, civic leaders, business and
professional people, and others, thereby offering perspectives from other parts of the
court system and the general public. The report claims that "[gleographic, gender and
racial balance would be sought" in the composition of the council. Id. at 34. Whether this
implied promise to include minorities on the council will satisfy minority legislators is
questionable. More importantly, it is unclear whether this change in the elective system
will satisfy § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, because there is no guarantee that minorities will
receive appointments. See infra notes 501-02 and accompanying text; see also supra notes
118-59 and accompanying text (discussing § 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
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the Jacksonian democracy ideal.43  The Futures Commission
recognized that the elimination of voter participation in the judicial
selection process would isolate the judiciary from the people, leaving
no effective check on judicial power.431 Therefore, the plan retains a
role for the voters by calling for new judges to face a noncompetitive
retention election one year after their initial appointment.432 The
public would vote only on whether the judge should remain in office.
If victorious, the judge would serve an eight-year term before facing
another retention election.433 In theory, retention elections would
create an effective means for removing those appointed judges who
were performing poorly.4 ' The power of the people would derive
from the knowledge that any judge could be voted off the bench if
desired.435
Fourteen states currently use some form of judicial retention
elections.436 Retention elections serve as a way to avoid the problems
associated with contested judicial elections.437 However, critics argue
that retention elections are prone to the same kinds of problems as
contested elections.43s The uncontested nature of retention elections,
ethical restraints on judicial campaign conduct, and voters' general
430. For discussion of Jacksonian democracy, see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying
text.
431. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 32.
432. See id.
433. See id.
434. Cf Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior,
77 JUDICATURE 306, 315 (1994) (noting that a survey of judges in 10 states showed that
"the behavior of retained judges is shaped by the existence of retention elections even
though the probability of losing is low").
435. The prospect of ultimately answering to the electorate will have a beneficial
effect on the humility and conduct of judges. See 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note
111, at 28-29.
436. See Deja, supra note 43, at 905-06. Ten states utilize retention elections in
conjunction with a merit selection system. See supra note 45. Illinois, Indiana, New
Mexico, and Pennsylvania use retention elections following initial contested elections.
See Deja, supra note 43, at 906.
437. See Editorial, Anti-Incumbency's Threat to Judicial Merit Selection, 76
JUDICATURE 56, 56 (1992) [hereinafter Anti-Incumbency] (arguing that one of the
primary purposes of merit selection and retention elections is "to remove the bench from
the vagaries of partisan politics and emphasize professional credentials"); see also Aspin
& Hall, supra note 434, at 315 ("[A]voiding partisan politics is one of the most often-cited
benefits of retention elections.").
438. See Ludwig, supra note 367, at 34 ("Given the demands of a partisan election and
convolutions of party politics, the retention election is a beneficial device, but it does not
remedy the basic problem."); cf Editorial, The Need for Judicial Performance Evaluations
for Retention Elections, 75 JUDICATURE 124, 124 (1991) [hereinafter Need for Judicial
Performance Evaluations] (noting that retention elections often suffer from an
uninformed electorate).
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lack of knowledge combine to create an "information vacuum. 439
The natural consequences of this vacuum are voter apathy and
uninformed voting without regard to a candidate's record or
qualifications. 440 Another potential danger is the ability of organized
special interest groups to campaign against retention of a judge based
upon a single issue." Under these circumstances, the voter receives
only one-sided information which has little to do with the judge's
qualifications. Such anti-retention campaigns, which usually focus on
hot-button issues like the death penalty or abortion, can threaten the
independence of the judiciary by forcing judges to consider the
impact of their court decisions on their chances for re-election."2
Likewise, a general anti-incumbency voting pattern can have a
detrimental effect on judges standing for retention election."3
Additionally, retention elections may include the " 'same kind of
political shenanigans'" as in other general elections.' The judicial
retention elections for the California Supreme Court in 1986
demonstrate just how political retention elections can become.44  In
that contest the voters removed Chief Justice Rose Bird and two
other justices from the supreme court because of their liberal views
concerning the death penalty, thus allowing the Governor to replace
them with more conservative justices." 6  Special interest groups
campaigned heavily against the incumbents, spending in excess of
seven million dollars."7
This type of negative, single-issue campaigning in retention
elections could also occur in North Carolina.448 Former Chief Justice
Exum has long supported a straight appointive system for the
judiciary, believing that any exposure of judges to elections is
439. Need for Judicial Performance Evaluations, supra note 438, at 124.
440. See id.
441. See id.
442. See id.
443. See Anti-Incumbency, supra note 437, at 56. But see Aspin & Hall, supra note
434, at 315 (providing the results of a 10-state survey which suggests that judges who face
retention elections view them very favorably).
444. Loren Singer, A Quick Overview of the Selection and Election of Judges, WEST'S
LEGAL NEWs, Nov. 12, 1996, available in WESTLAW, WLN Database (quoting Cornell
Law School Professor Charles W. Wolfram), 1996 WL 652141.
445. See STUMPF & CULVER, supra note 35, at 149.
446. See id.
447. See Levien & Fatka, supra note 226, at 76. The incumbent justices spent $4.5
million in their unsuccessful attempt to retain their seats, including $1 million in television
and radio advertising in the final week alone. See id.
448. But see 1985 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 28 (arguing that the
extremely high success rate of judges in retention elections-over 98%-indicates that
retention elections will not expose good judges to defeat by single-issue voting blocks).
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dangerous. 49 He cites the campaigning conducted by non-judicial
groups in North Carolina's 1986 supreme court elections as an
example of how special interest groups could wage ugly, expensive
campaigns against candidates standing for a retention vote.4 50
D. Performance Evaluations
North Carolina could seek to avoid the potential dangers of
retention elections by using judicial performance evaluations. 45 t
Several merit selection jurisdictions have established performance
evaluation programs that provide meaningful and objective
information to voters in retention elections. 2  Performance
evaluations have proven an effective way to address many of the
concerns presented by non-competitive retention elections, namely
voter apathy, uninformed voting, and the potential for well-funded
opposition groups to present negative, one-sided information on a
candidate. 4 3  States that have successfully used performance
evaluations for a number of years include Alaska, Colorado, and
Utah.454
Under the Futures Commission proposal, the State Judicial
Council would set forth procedures for evaluating the performance of
all judges,4 5 including assessments from other judges, litigants, jurors,
and attorneys, as well as a self-evaluation by the judge.456 The council
would also determine how these evaluations could best be presented
449. See Exum, supra note 71, at 8.
450. See id. at 6; see also supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text (discussing the
1986 supreme court race in North Carolina). The 1990 supreme court elections, which
featured numerous television and radio ads criticizing the decisions of sitting judges,
serves as another example. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text (discussing
the tactics of non-judicial actors in the 1990 elections).
451. Cf Susan Keilitz & Judith White McBride, Judicial Performance Evaluation
Comes of Age, 16 STATE CT. J., Winter 1992, at 4, 4 (arguing that judicial performance
evaluations "have evolved into powerful tools for the administration of justice.").
452. See Need for Judicial Performance Evaluations, supra note 438, at 124. These
performance evaluations also have provided sitting judges with valuable feedback about
the quality of their job performance. See id.
453. See Keilitz & McBride, supra note 451, at 4, 13.
454. See Need for Judicial Performance Evaluations, supra note 438, at 124. All of
these states use a combination of lawyers and non-lawyers in evaluating the judges. See
id. Alaska has used performance evaluations since 1976. See Keilitz & McBride, supra
note 451, at 4. The Colorado legislature established an evaluation program in 1990,
thereafter distributing nearly 2 million informative fliers in newspaper supplements at
each election. See id. at 10. Utah uses performance evaluation primarily as a tool for
judicial self-improvement, but also recognizes its value as a voter education program. See
Need for Judicial Performance Evaluations, supra note 438, at 124.
455. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 32.
456. See H.B. 742, 1997 N.C. General Assembly, Reg. Sess., at 13 (1997).
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to the public prior to each retention election, along with a
recommendation for or against retention.457 The neutral status of the
State Judicial Council, and the set procedures for evaluating judicial
performance would be key factors in the validity and usefulness of
the evaluations. 458
E. The Present State of the Futures Commission Proposal
The Futures Commission delivered its report to Chief Justice
Burley Mitchell in early December 1996.419  Both the proposed
constitutional amendment and the enabling act were introduced into
the General Assembly in April 1997.460 The Futures Commission
plan called for the General Assembly to pass the constitutional
amendment and enabling legislation in time for the proposal to be
put on the ballot in the general election of 1997.461 Special
committees were established in each house to consider the bills, but
no action was taken on either bill before the end of the 1997
session.462
VII. SUCCESS FOR MERIT SELECrION IN NORTH CAROLINA:
OBSTACLES TO CHANGE
James Drennan, the former director of the Administrative
Office of the Courts, noted five obstacles which hindered the 1989
and 1991 reform efforts aimed at eliminating the election of judges.463
These obstacles are just as relevant today, and unless proponents of
merit selection overcome them, it is unlikely that there will be a
significant change in the way judges are selected.
457. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 32.
458. No prior judicial reform plans in North Carolina contained a performance
evaluation procedure.
459. See Legislature Goes Slow on Courts, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May
16, 1997, at A3.
460. See H.B. 741, 1997 N.C. General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1997) (constitutional
amendment); H.B. 742, 1997 N.C. General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1997) (enabling act);
S.B. 834, 1997 N.C. General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1997) (constitutional amendment);
S.B. 835, 1997 N.C. General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1997) (enabling act).
461. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 69.
462. See Joan G. Brannon & James C. Drennan, in NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION
1997, at 60 (John L. Saxon ed., 1997) [hereinafter N.C. LEG. 1997]. The 1997 legislative
session extended into two extra sessions because of a bitter fight over budget legislation.
See Wade Rawlins, House, Senate Pass Budget, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug.
28, 1997, at Al.
463. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 37-40. These same obstacles also seemed to play a
role in the defeat of the 1995 reform effort. Cf. Betts, supra note 3, at 324-25 (discussing
reasons that the 1995 reform effort failed).
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First, those seeking to adopt a merit selection system must
communicate a very complex argument.461 They must convince the
General Assembly, and ultimately the voters, that the following are
true: (1) there is a growing problem with the election of judges which
eventually will lead to poor judges on the bench and a lack of public
confidence in the courts; (2) this problem has not been readily
apparent because most current judges first reached the bench by
appointment; and (3) an appointive system will not usurp power from
the people in favor of the governor's office or the bar association. 65
This is an extraordinary amount of information to communicate,
particularly given that the issue ultimately must be put to the people
as a simple constitutional referendum. 66
Second, proponents of judicial reform are dealing with a
constitutional issue, meaning they will have to convert more than a
mere majority of the General Assembly to their viewpoint.4 67 Before
an issue may be put before the public, three-fifths of the General
Assembly must approve a constitutional amendment.41 Hence, a
two-fifths minority can effectively block any proposal. Even if the
measures pass the General Assembly, a referendum still would have
to be approved by a majority of the public.4 69
464. See id. at 37.
465. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 37.
466. Illustrative of the complexity of the argument, and the potential consequences of
such complexity, are two polls that sought to gauge the level of public support for a switch
to an appointment system. In a 1989 Gallup poll, registered voters were asked a total of
35 questions about the intricacies of judicial selection and the proposed appointment
system. Sixty-five percent of those polled indicated they would support a switch to an
appointment system. See id. at 37. However, a different poll conducted by a marketing
and public relations firm asked a number of different questions on political issues, but
only a single question on judicial selection. In that poll, 73% opposed changing to an
appointment system. See Hunt Has Edge on Helms in Poll, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Mar. 14, 1989, at Al. One possible explanation for the differing results in the two
polls is that when a group of voters received a good deal of information about judicial
selection, such as a 35 question survey, they favored merit selection. Voters asked only if
they supported an appointment system felt differently. A constitutional referendum put
before the voting public would more closely resemble the one-question poll in which a
strong majority of voters disfavored judicial appointment. See Drennan, supra note 66, at
37.
467. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 37.
468. See supra note 80 (discussing vote requirements for constitutional amendment).
Judicial appointment bills have garnered the necessary number of votes on three
occasions in the Senate. See Betts, supra note 60, at 327 (noting the years 1989, 1991,
1995). However, no such bill has passed the House, with the most successful effort to
date being the 1995 bill that drew 62 votes. See id.
469. See N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (amendment procedure). Securing public approval
in a constitutional referendum certainly would not be automatic. See Philip L. Dubois,
Voter Responses to Court Reform: Merit Judicial Selection on the Ballot, 73 JUDICATURE
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Third, judicial selection is basically a lawyer's issue.4" While
non-lawyers should and do care about who sits on the bench, lawyers
care the most passionately.47' Lawyers intimately understand that a
judge can have a tremendous impact on the outcome of a case.472
This is particularly so for trial judges, whose decisions are usually
final because the cost and a low level of success often make appeals
prohibitively difficult.473 This heightened level of concern among
lawyers results in their inordinate influence on the issue of how to
select judges.47 4 The difficulty, however, is that lawyers in North
Carolina have not yet reached a firm consensus on how to deal with
the judicial selection issue.475 Three special interest legal groups in
North Carolina-African-American lawyers, female lawyers, and
trial lawyers-have all at one time opposed a switch to an
appointment system.476 This opposition contradicts the firm and
active support of the North Carolina Bar Association, which purports
to represent all of North Carolina's lawyers.477  Until North
Carolina's lawyers can reach a consensus, it is doubtful that the
General Assembly will make any change in the judicial selection
system unless forced to do so by litigation.478
Fourth, any change in the judicial selection process obviously
will have partisan implications.47 9 The party that benefits from the
current system will naturally resist any change. Ten years ago, the
Democratic Party had no real reason to tamper with the election
system because they dominated the judicial ranks as a result of their
relative advantage in voter registration.40  However, growing
238, 240 (1990) (analyzing the results of 28 separate elections in various states held to
determine whether to adopt some form of merit selection plan: 18 efforts succeeded and
10 failed).
470. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 38.
471. See icL
472. See id.
473. Cf. White, supra note 24, at 7 ("[I]t is the exception, rather than the rule, that
decisions of trial courts are appealed, to say nothing of the countless civil cases that are
settled without trial .... ).
474. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 38.
475. See id.
476. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
477. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 38. But see Rosch & Rubin, supra note 3, at 29
(arguing that the bar association is dominated by corporate interests and would therefore
choose judges favorable to their clients).
478. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 38; see also supra notes 151-59 and accompanying
text (discussing changes made in the judicial election system in response to litigation by
African-Americans and Republicans).
479. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 38.
480. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text (noting past Democratic political
dominance).
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Republican success at the polls, as evidenced by the 1988 and 1994
elections,481 may cause Democrats to reconsider their position. For
their part, Republicans may think they are now in a position to
benefit from the partisan election of judges. In addition, the
possibility of a Republican governor in 2000 is also a factor, as that
person will fill all judicial vacancies if the present judicial selection
system is not changed.4
Fifth, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 applies to judicial elections.483 Any
shift from an electoral to an appointive system constitutes a change
affecting voting and thus falls within the Act. Therefore, the change
must be precleared by the Justice Department under § 5.484 If the
change to an appointive system adversely impacts African-Americans
or other minorities, preclearance may not be granted .4  The problem
is that judicial appointment advocates cannot guarantee that a
sufficient number of African-Americans and minorities would be
appointed to the bench by the governor.486 As a result, the Voting
Rights Act essentially gives African-American legislators a veto, or
at least significant leverage, over any appointive system which the
General Assembly attempts to implement.4s
The supermajority requirement for constitutional amendments is
not likely to be met, and judicial reform will not be achieved, unless
these obstacles are overcome. Namely, the special interest legal
groups must come to view the appointment of judges as beneficial to
their interests.' Unfortunately, such a result may only come from
increasingly competitive partisan elections and a significant
481. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (noting recent Republican
success).
482. Republicans have won three of the last seven gubernatorial races, with Jim Hunt
owning all four of the Democrats' victories. See DEPARTMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF
STATE, supra note 64, at 209. Recall that a majority of all judges currently on the bench
in North Carolina were initially appointed by the governor to fill vacancies. See Betts,
supra note 60, at 322. For further discussion see supra notes 107-13 and accompanying
text.
483. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 384 (1991); Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Attorney Gen. of Tex., 501 U.S. 419,425 (1991); supra note 159.
484. See supra note 118 (discussing § 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
485. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 39.
486. This problem is particularly so in the Superior Court Division where, under
Chapter 509, ten superior court districts should produce African-American judges under
an election system. See Act of June 29, 1987, ch. 509, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 769; N.C.
LEG. 1987, supra note 120, at 50 ("[Ihe result of the new districting system is expected to
be 10 non-white resident judges of the superior court.").
487. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 40.
488. See id.
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politicization of the judiciary. Further, both Democrats and
Republicans must agree on a solution because neither holds the
necessary three-fifths majority in both houses of the General
Assembly.489 An agreement will be reached only if both parties
simultaneously view an appointment system as in their best interests.
Lastly, any proposed plan must withstand the scrutiny of the Justice
Department, because preclearance will be necessary under § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act to ensure that African-Americans have an
adequate way of securing representation under the new system.4 90
VIII. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF THE FUTURES
COMMISSION PROPOSAL
The Futures Commission spent two years studying the courts of
North Carolina in an effort to forge a better and more effective
justice system. 491 Its members were well aware of North Carolina's
failed attempts to adopt some form of merit selection over the past
twenty-five years.4 2 Yet, they made the merit selection of judges one
of the central features of their redesigned court system.493 Perhaps
the Futures Commission plan, which seems crafted to avoid many of
the difficulties that plagued past reform efforts, will meet with
success. At least according to the Futures Commission poll, the
voters of North Carolina support a change in the current system of
judicial selection.494
The judicial nominating council is integral to the overall success
of the Futures Commission proposal, as it is the heart of a merit
selection plan.495 Past reform efforts have failed, in part, due to
disputes over the composition of such councils and the possibility of
partiality in the selection of judicial candidates. 496 However, the
Futures Commission proposal of a nominating council high in stature
and visibility seeks to thwart notions of secret group meetings
489. Prior to the 1998 elections, Democrats controlled the Senate by a 30-20 margin.
See Rob Christensen, Election Forecast: 1998 Will Be the Year of the Status Quo, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 10, 1997, at A3. The Republicans controlled the House
by a slimmer 61-59 margin. See id.
490. See Drennan, supra note 66, at 40.
491. See WFDD, supra note 4, at iii.
492. See supra notes 267-336 and accompanying text (discussing this legislative
history).
493. See WFDD, supra note 4, at iii.
494. See id. at 9. But see note 466 (looking at the level of voter support for judicial
appointment when the voters are relatively uninformed about the subject).
495. See 1987 COURTS COMMISSION, supra note 192, at 6.
496. See supra notes 406-12 and accompanying text.
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dominated by any group or special interest.49 Indeed, the make-up
of the proposed council seems to draw from a sufficiently diverse
pool to ensure that bickering between political parties, special
interest groups, and even different branches of the government
should be minimized.
In terms of the current political environment, the General
Assembly seems more open to reform of the judicial selection
process than ever before, indicating that dissatisfaction with the
current selection system may be reaching a critical mass. The recent
change to nonpartisan elections for superior court judges is a good
example of this willingness to change.48  Although there may be
legislators who wish to wait and see the effect of the switch to
nonpartisan elections, it is unlikely that this sentiment would be a
fatal impediment to a strong push for a merit selection system,
particularly considering the limited applicability of the latest reform
effort. 49 9  Given the broad input into the appointment process
afforded by the proposed nominating council, and the general
distaste for the continuing trends in judicial elections, the Futures
Commission proposal may well succeed."'
One negative aspect of the Futures Commission proposal, which
could ultimately prove fatal, is its failure to address racial issues in
the appointment of judges. Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, a
switch to the appointment of judges requires Justice Department
clearance, as the change would have the potential to affect adversely
the ability of minorities to secure adequate representation on the
bench."' The only mention of racial matters in the Futures
Commission report is the assurance that "gender and racial balance
would be sought" in the nominating council."° Such an assurance
497. See WFDD, supra note 4, at 34-35.
498. Recall, however, that these reforms were essentially in response to litigation and
therefore may not be a reliable indicator of the General Assembly's willingness to change
the current system. See N.C. LEG. 1996, supra note 2, at 3-3.
499. Appellate judgeships, which are obviously the highest profile judicial campaigns,
and district court judgeships, which are usually the most heavily contested, continue to be
decided in partisan elections. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, ch. 9, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d
Extra Sess. 536.
500. As mentioned previously, the proposal was not adopted during the 1997 session,
as urged by the Futures Commission. See supra notes 461-62 and accompanying text.
However, the fierce battle over the budget took center stage, and the matter of judicial
selection will likely be addressed in the short session in 1998. See supra note 462 and
accompanying text.
501. Minorities currently comprise a majority of the electorate, and thus are "safe" in
eight superior court districts as designed by the 1987 changes. See supra note 118
(discussing the Voting Rights Act).
502. WFDD, supra note 4, at 34. The assurance offered in the proposed implementing
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alone might not meet the approval of minority legislators in the
General Assembly or Justice Department officials. However, it is
possible that the Futures Commission intentionally chose not to
include specific information concerning the potentially divisive issue
of race in the hopes that the proposal would garner broad support
and momentum going into the legislative session. At that time, a
more acceptable provision concerning the race issue could be added
during the legislative process.
Ultimately, the Futures Commission proposal, or any other type
of judicial reform, will only succeed to the extent that political
parties, special interest groups, and the public deem such reform to
be in their best interests. Only then will the numerous obstacles to
judicial reform be overcome. Profound distaste for the current state
of judicial elections, as well as concern over the quality of judges on
the bench in the future, may well provide the spark.
SAMUEL LATHAM GRIMES
legislation is equally illusory: "The appointing authorities shall confer with each other and
attempt to arrange their appointments so that members of the State Judicial Council
fairly represent each area of the State, both genders, and each major racial group." H.B.
742, 1997 N.C. General Assembly, Reg. Sess., at 12 (1997).
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